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THE MODEST IMPACT
OF PALAZZOLO V. RHODE ISLAND
Gregory M. Stein*†
ABSTRACT
Before 2001, state and federal courts did not agree on the extent to
which a property owner’s regulatory takings claim should be weakened by
the existence of legal restrictions on her use of the property at the time she
acquired it. The Palazzolo Court addressed this doctrinal confusion but did
not completely resolve it, offering six opinions that partially contradict each
other. Some of this discord has persisted, with Palazzolo already cited in
nearly 500 judicial opinions, and not always consistently.
This Article examines the impact Palazzolo has had on state and lower
federal courts. After reviewing the law before Palazzolo and the Supreme
Court’s decision in that case, the Article offers suggestions as to how courts
ought to interpret the contradictory opinions in Palazzolo. More
specifically, cases arising at different points in the ripening process should
be treated differently, and only a small subset of takings claims should
benefit from Palazzolo’s relaxation of the notice rule.
Next the Article assesses the evidence, in an effort to determine
whether courts interpreting Palazzolo have actually been following these
suggestions. First, it examines the small number of claims in which an
owner that probably would have lost before 2001 prevailed. It then
compares these results with the far more numerous cases in which an owner
that probably would have lost before 2001 still lost even after that decision.
The Article closes by offering a more generalized assessment of the
effects of Palazzolo. It concludes that nearly all of the courts to cite
Palazzolo have heeded its requirements, but only a few cases have turned
out differently than they would have before 2001. The Court’s ripeness
rules dictate that few landowners should benefit from the holding in
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Palazzolo, and only a small number actually do benefit. Lower courts
understand Palazzolo, they have been applying it correctly, and they should
continue to do what they have been doing.
INTRODUCTION
Before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Palazzolo v. Rhode Island1 in
2001, state and federal courts did not agree on the extent to which a
property owner’s regulatory takings claim should be weakened by the
existence of legal restrictions on her use of the property at the time she
acquired it. Regulatory agencies argued that owners could not reasonably
form investment-backed expectations that they would be allowed to use
property in ways that were already restricted at the time they first took title
and thus should not be able to recover takings compensation in these cases.
Owners responded that a restriction on one owner’s property that amounts
to a taking of property without just compensation does not suddenly
become non-compensable merely because that owner happens to transfer
the property to a successor owner. Most courts favored the first of these
arguments, but the cases addressing these so-called “notice-rule” disputes
were not unanimous.
Palazzolo confronted this doctrinal confusion but did not completely
resolve it. The Palazzolo Court tackled a notice-rule problem as well as two
other overlapping issues and responded by offering six opinions, with
different majorities deciding each question and concurring Justices
pointedly disagreeing with each other. Lower courts have struggled to
interpret Palazzolo, and the case has been cited in judicial opinions nearly
500 times to date, and not always consistently.
This Article examines the effects of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island on state
and lower federal courts. It describes how courts have addressed the noticerule issue since 2001, seeks to ascertain whether judges have been able to
elucidate any coherent doctrine from the Justices’ confusing opinions, and
tries to predict how courts will decide notice-rule cases in the future.
Part I describes the state of the law before Palazzolo, and Part II
summarizes the badly fractured Court’s attempt to resolve the notice-rule
question in that 2001 case. Part III offers suggestions as to how courts
ought to interpret Palazzolo, by emphasizing that cases at different points in
the ripening process should be treated differently.
1. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
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The Court has long held that direct condemnation claims and inverse
physical takings claims are non-transferable,2 and Part III suggests that
facial regulatory takings claims and some as-applied regulatory takings
claims differ little from physical takings claims. By contrast, successor
owners that acquire property before their predecessors have sought to ripen
a regulatory takings claim should be the primary beneficiaries of
Palazzolo’s relaxation of the notice rule. In these settings, the first owner
has had little opportunity to ascertain the precise effects that the land use
control will have on the property.
Part IV assesses the evidence, in an effort to determine whether courts
interpreting Palazzolo to date have actually been following these
suggestions. Part IV.A introduces the lower court cases and begins to
dissect the numbers. Part IV.B examines the few cases in which Palazzolo
may have changed the outcome. These are claims in which an owner that
prevailed probably would have lost before 2001. Part IV.C discusses some
of the cases to arise soon after Palazzolo in which that decision probably
did not change the outcome. These far more numerous cases are claims in
which an owner that probably would have lost before 2001 still lost even
after this decision. Part IV.D then addresses some of the more recent cases
that fall within this same category, asking whether courts are following the
dictates of Palazzolo or ignoring it and, if the latter, why this might be the
case. Finally, Part IV.E discusses some unusual cases that do not fall into
any of the patterns described in the three prior subparts.
Part V offers a more generalized assessment of the effect Palazzolo has
had so far. Drawing on the evidence from the cases discussed previously,
this Part ultimately concludes that even the most recent cases have been
paying close attention to the demands of Palazzolo—in fact, they conform
fairly closely to the predictions laid out in Part III. Palazzolo should not
have affected the result in many cases, and it has not done so. Contrary to
the arguments of critics of the lower courts, these courts have been
following Palazzolo in ways these critics could have foreseen in 2001. For
the most part, courts seeking to apply the confusing rule of Palazzolo have
been getting it right and should continue to do what they have been doing.

2. Id. at 628 (citing Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271 (1939)).
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I. THE NOTICE ISSUE BEFORE PALAZZOLO
The New York Court of Appeals decided four cases on the same day—
February 18, 1997—addressing the notice rule. In all four cases, the court
held that a person who acquires title with notice of existing land use
regulations cannot successfully maintain a takings claim when the
government enforces those regulations to the owner’s detriment. For
example, in Gazza v. New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation, Gazza acquired a waterfront lot twelve years after it became
subject to state wetlands regulations.3 He sought two variances that would
allow him to build a single-family residence within the tidal wetlands
boundary, both of which were denied.4 Gazza then commenced a
proceeding in state court arguing that the denials constituted an
uncompensated taking of his property.5
The New York Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the State. Five of the
six judges who participated joined an opinion stating: “Petitioner cannot
base a taking claim upon an interest he never owned. The relevant property
interests owned by the petitioner are defined by those State laws enacted
and in effect at the time he took title . . . .”6 In short, the State could not
have taken a property interest from Gazza if that interest was never part of
his bundle of property rights in the first place.
The court reached similar results in three other cases. In Kim v. City of
New York, the court ruled in favor of the defendant, because “plaintiffs’ title
never encompassed the property interest they claim has been taken.”7 In
Anello v. Zoning Board of Appeals, the court rejected the owner’s claim,
because a statute “encumbered petitioner’s title from the outset of her
ownership and its enforcement does not constitute a governmental taking of
any property interest owned by her.”8 Finally, in Basile v. Town of
Southampton, the court stated: “Whatever taking claim the prior landowner
may have had against the environmental regulation of the subject parcel,
any property interest that might serve as the foundation for such a claim

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Gazza v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 634 N.Y.S.2d 740, 740 (App. Div. 1995).
Gazza v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 679 N.E.2d 1035, 1036 (N.Y. 1997).
Id. at 1037.
Id. at 1040.
Kim v. City of New York, 681 N.E.2d 312, 314 (N.Y. 1997).
Anello v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 678 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1997).
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was not owned by claimant here who took title after the redefinition of the
relevant property interests.”9
Other courts had occasion to address this issue in the years before the
Supreme Court’s decision in Palazzolo, and most of these results were in
accord with the four New York cases.10 The Iowa Supreme Court rejected a
takings claim brought by property owners who were unable to use part of
their land after discovering a Native American burial mound on it, because
a state law that predated the plaintiffs’ acquisition of title prohibited
disinterment of the burial mound and required maintenance of a buffer zone
around it for its protection.11 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
reached a similar result in Leonard v. Town of Brimfield.12 That court
denied compensation to an owner who was unable to use approximately
60% of her land after she bought property that was subject to restrictions on
building in a flood plain.13 And in the widely noted Stevens v. City of
Cannon Beach, the Supreme Court of Oregon concluded that property
owners had not suffered a taking because they were on notice when they
acquired their property that they did not have exclusive use of the dry sand
areas of their beach.14 Several other states were in nearly complete
agreement.15
9. Basile v. Town of Southampton, 678 N.E.2d 489, 490–91 (N.Y. 1997).
10. For a general overview of the notice rule before Palazzolo, see Gregory M. Stein, Who
Gets the Takings Claim? Changes in Land Use Law, Pre-Enactment Owners, and Post-Enactment
Buyers, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (2000).
11. Hunziker v. State, 519 N.W.2d 367, 371 (Iowa 1994).
12. Leonard v. Town of Brimfield, 666 N.E.2d 1300 (Mass. 1996).
13. Id. at 1303–04.
14. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456 (Ore. 1993); see also Dodd v. Hood
River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1230 (9th Cir. 1998) (reaching a similar result under both Oregon and
federal law).
15. See, e.g., Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Leisz, 702 N.E.2d 1026, 1030–31 (Ind. 1998) (finding
no taking of a prior nonconforming use when post-enactment buyers were on constructive notice of a
change in the law at the time they acquired their property); Myron v. City of Plymouth, 562 N.W.2d 21,
23–24 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a post-enactment buyer cannot later bring a takings claim
and noting that the buyer’s gamble presumably was reflected in the purchase price), overruled by
Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 638 n.11, 642 (Minn. 2007) (overruling
Myron based on Palazzolo; plaintiff’s claim nonetheless failed on the facts); Claridge v. N.H. Wetlands
Bd., 485 A.2d 287, 291 (N.H. 1984) (“A person who purchases land with notice of statutory
impediments to the right to develop that land can justify few, if any, legitimate investment-backed
expectations of development rights which rise to the level of constitutionally protected property
rights.”); Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 461 S.E.2d 388, 391 (S.C. 1995) (finding no taking after a state
agency denied a fill permit to the property owner because the owner acquired the property after the state
had designated it as critical area tidelands); Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 936 (Tex.
1998) (holding that an owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations should have factored in
zoning restrictions in effect at the time the owner acquired the property); City of Va. Beach v. Bell, 498
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Other states reached similar results, if somewhat more equivocally or
on somewhat more unusual facts. For instance, the Supreme Court of
Connecticut, anticipating to some degree the outcome in Palazzolo,
suggested in Gil v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency that a postenactment buyer’s expectations at the time of purchase are relevant to a
takings claim but found the rule inapplicable to the case and remanded it.16
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island largely agreed, in Alegria v. Keeney,
holding that an owner’s knowledge of wetlands restrictions at the time of
his purchase is relevant in determining whether he reasonably could expect
to develop property as though wetlands were not present,17 although that
court’s subsequent holding in Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares supported
the government’s position more strongly.18 Some other state courts, and at
least one federal court, were more or less in accord.19
Only the Michigan Court of Appeals appears to have been in full
agreement with landowners bringing notice-rule claims. That court
expressly stated, in Guy v. Brandon Township, that owners who were on
notice of restrictions existing at the time of their acquisition nonetheless
may challenge those rules, found a temporary taking by virtue of overly
restrictive zoning, and remanded the case for a determination of
compensation.20 Note, however, that Guy relies in part on two prior
S.E.2d 414, 417 (Va. 1998) (finding no taking when property owners acquired title after the city’s dune
protection ordinance became effective, even though the ordinance may have rendered their property
economically valueless).
16. Gil v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency, 593 A.2d 1368, 1373–75 (Conn. 1991).
17. Alegria v. Keeney, 687 A.2d 1249, 1253–54 (R.I. 1997).
18. Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 714–17 (R.I. 2000) (dictum) (finding a
regulatory takings claim unripe but discussing the merits of the claim anyway and finding no taking),
rev’d, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
19. McNulty v. Town of Indialantic, 727 F. Supp. 604, 612 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (“By purchasing
property with regulatory impediments and waiting to develop it, he took the risk that regulation would
become more harsh in the face of increasing concern over dune ecology.”); Pub. Access Shoreline Haw.
v. Haw. Cnty. Planning Comm’n, 903 P.2d 1246, 1263 (Haw. 1995) (recognizing the priority of certain
“[t]raditional and customary rights” in property even if they are “deemed inconsistent with generally
understood elements of the western doctrine of ‘property’”); Karam v. State Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 705
A.2d 1221, 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (noting that “the right of a property owner to fair
compensation when his property is zoned into inutility by changes in the zoning law passes to the next
owner despite the latter’s knowledge of the impediment to development” while simultaneously holding
that the pre-enactment owners and the post-enactment buyers both were on notice of permitting
requirement for dock construction and that the post-enactment buyers therefore could not assume that
they would be immune from all expansions in this law over time), aff’d, 723 A.2d 943 (N.J. 1999) (per
curiam); Hoover v. Pierce County, 903 P.2d 464, 468–70 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that
subsequent purchasers may not recover for a physical taking that occurred prior to their ownership).
20. Guy v. Brandon Township, 450 N.W.2d 279, 285–86 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam).
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Michigan Supreme Court cases, both of which held merely that postenactment buyers may challenge laws in effect at the time they acquired
title.21 Neither of these earlier Michigan cases had reached the separate
question of whether the post-enactment buyer had suffered a taking without
just compensation. This distinction is actually quite important, and
numerous state courts—including several that had rejected takings claims
by owners that acquired property after the challenged regulations became
effective—had allowed these same owners to seek variances from or
challenge the application or validity of these same regulations.22
In short, most cases to address the notice-rule question before
Palazzolo had favored the government defendant’s argument that an
owner’s knowledge of laws existing as of her acquisition date precluded her
subsequent takings claim arising from the application of those laws. One
state appeals court had ruled to the contrary on a questionable reading of its
own state supreme court’s prior decisions. And several states had found the
owner’s knowledge to be relevant to her claim, though not preclusive. Some
of these opinions were less than clear, some involved facts that were not
precisely on point, and several addressed plaintiffs who sought relief other
than takings compensation.

21. Johnson v. Township of Robinson, 359 N.W.2d 526 (Mich. 1984); Kropf v. City of
Sterling Heights, 215 N.W.2d 179 (Mich. 1974).
22. See, e.g., Leonard v. Town of Brimfield, 666 N.E.2d 1300, 1303 & n.3 (Mass. 1996)
(distinguishing between suits challenging the validity of land use regulations and suits seeking takings
compensation); Lopes v. City of Peabody, 629 N.E.2d 1312, 1314–15 nn.7–8 (Mass. 1994) (allowing a
post-enactment buyer to challenge the validity of an ordinance but avoiding discussion of whether that
buyer also could bring a takings claim, as the latter question was not before it); Myron v. City of
Plymouth, 562 N.W.2d 21, 24 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (allowing a post-enactment buyer to seek a
variance while disallowing the same buyer’s takings claim), overruled by Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City
of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623 (Minn. 2007) (overruling Myron based on Palazzolo; plaintiff’s claim
nonetheless failed on the facts); Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 643 N.E.2d 479, 480 (N.Y. 1994)
(upholding a challenge to certain rent stabilization provisions brought by post-enactment buyers);
Spence v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 496 S.E.2d 61, 63 (Va. 1998) (allowing a post-enactment buyer to
seek a variance even though the buyer had obtained the property for a reduced purchase price because
the previous owner’s variance application had been denied); cf. Twigg v. Town of Kennebunk, 662 A.2d
914, 916 (Me. 1995) (finding that a post-enactment buyer’s knowledge of prior zoning restrictions is one
factor in determining whether a zoning variance should be granted); Friedenburg v. N.Y. State Dep’t of
Envtl. Conservation, 658 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (distinguishing between suits that
claim the government has taken property and suits that seek to annul administrative determinations as
arbitrary and capricious). See generally Steven J. Eagle, The 1997 Regulatory Takings Quartet:
Retreating from the “Rule of Law,” 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 345, 360–66 (1998) (discussing this issue).
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II. PALAZZOLO AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island presented facts similar to many of the lower
court cases discussed above.23 Shore Gardens, Inc. (SGI), acquired
approximately twenty acres of coastal property in 1959.24 While SGI owned
the property, Rhode Island enacted legislation and regulations significantly
limiting the use of certain coastal property, including much of that owned
by SGI.25 Rhode Island revoked SGI’s corporate charter in 1978 for failure
to pay corporate income taxes.26 As a result, SGI’s property passed by
operation of law to its sole shareholder, Anthony Palazzolo. Palazzolo
subsequently sought to fill the property and later requested a permit to build
a private beach club.27 The state’s Coastal Resources Management Council
rejected both proposals as violating the state’s Coastal Resources
Management Program and as not deserving of a special exception.28
Palazzolo challenged the second of these denials in state court, seeking
compensation for an inverse condemnation.29
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling
rejecting Palazzolo’s claim.30 The court concluded that his claim was not
ripe but nevertheless proceeded to deny it on the merits for two different
reasons.31 The state supreme court concluded that Palazzolo had no right to
challenge the application of regulations that predated his acquisition of the
property.32 The court also rejected Palazzolo’s argument that he had been
deprived of all economically viable use of his property, in violation of
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, based on uncontradicted evidence
that part of his property could still be used and was worth $200,000.33
The state court determined that Palazzolo’s acquisition of title with
notice of existing limitations on land use undermined his argument in two
related ways. Even if Palazzolo had been able to show, as Lucas demands,
that he was deprived of all economically viable use of his property, his
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 613–15 (2001).
Id. at 613.
Id. at 614.
Id.
Id. at 614–15.
Id.
Id. at 615–16.
Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 717 (R.I. 2000), rev’d, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
Id. at 714–17.
Id. at 717.
Id. at 714–17.
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knowledge of the existing land use regime would demonstrate that “the
proscribed use interests were not part of his . . . title to begin with.”34 Under
Lucas, such a showing demonstrates that Palazzolo was not actually
deprived of any property right, because his estate never included the right to
use the property in the manner he proposed. In addition, Palazzolo’s notice
of these laws undercut his claim that his reasonable investment-backed
expectations were constitutionally impaired under the more flexible test
established in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City (Penn
Central).35 “In light of these [pre-existing] regulations, Palazzolo could not
reasonably have expected that he could fill the property . . . .”36
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on three different issues: (i)
whether the case was ripe; (ii) the extent to which Palazzolo’s notice of the
relevant laws at the time he succeeded to title affected his reasonable
investment-backed expectations; and (iii) whether Palazzolo had suffered a
Lucas-type taking.37 In ultimately deciding the case, the Justices authored a
total of six opinions, thus offering mixed messages to future litigants
seeking to interpret the Court’s views on the notice rule. Because three of
the Justices would have rejected Palazzolo’s claims on ripeness grounds,
they discuss the substantive notice-rule issue only in short passages in their
dissents. Five of the remaining six Justices joined the Court’s opinion on
the notice-rule issue, but two of those five—Justices O’Connor and
Scalia—concurred separately to note their incompatible understandings of
the meaning of that opinion.
On the notice-rule issue, the Court reversed the state court’s holding
that Palazzolo’s prior knowledge of legal restrictions automatically barred
his regulatory takings claim.38 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the fivemember majority on this issue states that “[some] enactments are
unreasonable and do not become less so through passage of time or
title. . . . A State would be allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on
the Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule.”39 The Court observed
that such an outcome also is unfair to the owner at the time the regulation

34. Id. at 715 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992)), rev’d, 533
U.S. 606 (2001).
35. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
36. Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 717 (R.I. 2000), rev’d, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
37. Id., cert. granted, 531 U.S. 923 (Oct. 10, 2000) (No. 99-2047).
38. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626–30 (2001).
39. Id. at 627.
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becomes effective, because that earlier owner might not be in a position to
undertake and complete the lengthy process of ripening a takings claim.40
The Court’s discussion of the notice issue contrasts more
straightforward direct condemnations with inverse regulatory takings.
When the government takes property directly, “any award goes to the owner
at the time of the taking, and . . . the right to compensation is not passed to a
subsequent purchaser.”41 These claims are fully developed at the time the
government takes the property, and at that instant, “the fact and extent of
the taking are known.”42 If there has been a direct taking, the government
initiated the act and concedes that the taking occurred, and a court can
readily determine when it occurred and who owned the property at that
moment. The owner at the time of the taking is the only party entitled to
recover compensation and may not transfer this fully ripened claim.
Similarly, inverse physical takings crystallize at a distinct moment, and
claims for inverse physical takings may not be transferred.43
As-applied inverse regulatory takings claims differ. By their very
nature, these claims do “not mature until ripeness requirements have been
satisfied, . . . [and] until this point an inverse condemnation claim alleging a
regulatory taking cannot be maintained.”44 Since the owner must clear the
Court’s ripeness hurdles before bringing a federal takings claim, “[i]t would
be illogical, and unfair, to bar a regulatory takings claim because of the
post-enactment transfer of ownership where the steps necessary to make the
claim ripe were not taken, or could not have been taken, by a previous
owner.”45 A party that acquires property with knowledge of a pre-existing
limitation on its use thus cannot be categorically barred from subsequently
bringing an as-applied regulatory takings claim. However, the Court has
40. Id. at 627–28.
41. Id. at 628 (citing Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 284 (1939)).
42. Id.; cf. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028–29 (1992) (noting that a preexisting government easement would constitute a limitation on the owner’s title).
43. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628 (citing Danforth, 308 U.S. at 284); see also United States v.
Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 25 (1958) (“[C]ertainty is not lacking under the rule . . . which fixes the ‘taking’ at
the time of the entry into physical possession—a fact readily ascertainable whether or not the
Government makes use of condemnation proceedings, and whether or not it ever files a declaration of
taking.”). For a general discussion of the different types of inverse condemnation claims, see James G.
Greilsheimer & Cynthia Lovinger Siderman, Inverse Condemnation, in EMINENT DOMAIN: A
HANDBOOK OF CONDEMNATION LAW 123, 124–30 (William Scheiderich, Cynthia M. Fraser & David
Callies eds., 2011).
44. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628; see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321–25 (2002) (emphasizing the distinctions between physical takings
and regulatory takings).
45. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628.
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“no occasion to consider the precise circumstances when a legislative
enactment can be deemed a background principle of state law . . . . The
determination whether an existing, general law can limit all economic use
of property must turn on objective factors, such as the nature of the land use
proscribed.”46 The Court concluded that there may be some circumstances
in which a party who buys land with knowledge of a pre-existing limitation
on her use of the property nonetheless may maintain an as-applied
regulatory takings claim.47
The Justices explored this issue further in five additional opinions, at
least two of which directly contradict one another. Justice Scalia penned a
brief concurrence in which he declares that the state of the law when the
owner obtained title should be completely irrelevant.48 This concurrence
responds pointedly to Justice O’Connor’s disagreement on this issue. “In
my view,” Justice Scalia writes, “the fact that a restriction existed at the
time the purchaser took title . . . should have no bearing upon the
determination of whether the restriction is so substantial as to constitute a
taking.”49 The transfer of title does not undo the effect of a prior
unconstitutional law, and the expectations of a successor owner need not
account for the application of a law that takes property unconstitutionally.
“The ‘investment-backed expectations’ that the law will take into account
do not include the assumed validity of a restriction that in fact deprives
property of so much of its value as to be unconstitutional.”50
Justice O’Connor also joined the opinion of the Court but disagreed
entirely with Justice Scalia. Her concurrence focuses on the interplay
between the Court’s interpretation of the notice rule in Palazzolo and its
discussion of investment-backed expectations in Penn Central, noting,
“[t]he more difficult question is what role the temporal relationship between
46. Id. at 629–30. Note that the Court is actually merging Lucas and Penn Central issues here.
Lucas addresses cases in which the government’s actions deprive the owner of all or nearly all of the
property’s value, while Penn Central addresses government actions that have less drastic effects. Under
Lucas, the government’s only defense to an owner’s demonstration that she has been deprived of all
economically viable use of her property is that the government restriction already formed an inherent
limitation on the owner’s use of her property when she acquired it. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–32. By
contrast, under Penn Central, the primary question is the effect of an owner’s knowledge of existing law
on her investment-backed expectations. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136–
38 (1978). The Palazzolo Court states that “the two holdings together amount to a single, sweeping,
rule,” and remands for further exploration of the Penn Central question. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626.
47. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629–30.
48. Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
49. Id.
50. Id.
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regulatory enactment and title acquisition plays in a proper Penn Central
analysis.”51 In contrast with the remaining three Justices in the five-member
majority, who refuse to opine as to precisely how important an owner’s
knowledge of prior law is, Justice O’Connor states that this factor should
figure heavily in a court’s deliberations. Rejecting both Justice Scalia’s and
Rhode Island’s more expansive—and opposing—positions, she observes
that “it would be just as much error to expunge this consideration from the
takings inquiry as it would be to accord it exclusive significance.”52
Given that Justice O’Connor serves as the important fifth vote to reject
the rule that notice of existing law bars a takings claim, her repeated
emphasis on Penn Central and its balancing tests is of great importance.
She cites that opinion nineteen times in her eight paragraphs, once calling it
“[o]ur polestar.”53 Referring to Penn Central and other cases, Justice
O’Connor notes, “[u]nder these cases, interference with investment-backed
expectations is one of a number of factors that a court must examine.
Further, the regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant acquires the
property at issue helps to shape the reasonableness of those expectations.”54
She summarizes her views by noting, “[c]ourts properly consider the effect
of existing regulations under the rubric of investment-backed expectations
in determining whether a compensable taking has occurred.”55 To Justice
O’Connor, then, the fact that an owner acquired property that was already
subject to a restrictive law is one of the factors a court must consider in
determining what the owner’s expectations are and whether they are
reasonable.
Four Justices dissented on this issue, and three of them authored
opinions. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Souter and Justice Breyer,
51. Id. at 632–33 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 633.
53. Id. The Court reaffirmed Palazzolo a year later, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc.
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. 535 U.S. 302 (2002). Justice Stevens’s opinion for the TahoeSierra Court refers to Penn Central more than forty times and also approvingly cites Justice O’Connor’s
Palazzolo concurrence five times. Id. at 315–42. More recently, the Court unanimously reaffirmed Penn
Central, citing it repeatedly in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538–48 (2005). Of course,
the retirement of Justices O’Connor and Stevens from the Court, coupled with the fact that the Court has
not decided a significant regulatory takings case since their departures, leaves open the question of how
central a role her Palazzolo concurrence will play in the future.
54. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 635–36. Justice O’Connor also notes, “[e]valuation of the degree of interference with
investment-backed expectations instead is one factor that points toward the answer to the question
whether the application of a particular regulation to particular property ‘goes too far.’” Id. at 634
(quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
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found Palazzolo’s claim unripe. But were it ripe, “I would, at a minimum,
agree with Justice O’Connor, Justice Stevens, and Justice Breyer, that
transfer of title can impair a takings claim.”56 Justice Breyer also dissented
separately to highlight this point. He shares Justice O’Connor’s view that
the status of the law on the acquisition date is a factor in an owner’s
expectations, but he finds this factor to be even more relevant than she does,
arguing that it matters greatly. To Justice Breyer, the owner acquiring
regulated property holds expectations that “will diminish in force and
significance—rapidly and dramatically—as property continues to change
hands over time. I believe that such factors can adequately be taken into
account within the Penn Central framework.”57 Justice Stevens joined the
Court in finding Palazzolo’s claim to be ripe. But in those cases in which a
landowner acquires regulated land and has not yet determined how the
government will apply those regulations, “I would treat the owners’ notice
as relevant to the evaluation of whether the regulation goes ‘too far,’ but not
necessarily dispositive.”58
The Court’s six opinions in Palazzolo raise difficult interpretation
issues, but only Justice Scalia flatly rejects the argument that an owner’s
expectations as of the date of acquisition are relevant.59 Five members of
the Court support the argument that these expectations matter—perhaps
very much—and three others fail to join Justice Scalia’s concurrence that
squarely rejects this argument.60 One majority ruled, in accordance with
Palazzolo’s argument, that an owner’s knowledge of existing law does not
categorically bar that owner’s regulatory takings claim, but a different
majority stated that this knowledge is relevant to that claim and may
weaken it considerably. On remand, the Rhode Island Superior Court
followed both of these directives. While conceding that its own state
supreme court’s earlier holding had been reversed on the notice issue, the

56. Id. at 654 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
57. Id. at 655 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 643 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing id. at 632–36
(O’Connor, J., concurring)).
59. Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
60. One of these three, Justice Kennedy, had previously indicated that he shares some of the
dissenters’ views. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034–35 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (noting that “the test must be whether [a] deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investmentbacked expectations” and adding that “courts must consider all reasonable expectations whatever their
source”). However, his failure to join any of the four Palazzolo opinions advocating similar arguments
raises the question of whether he still holds this view.
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superior court directly cited Justice O’Connor’s concurrence as it ruled in
the State’s favor once again.61
III. TYPES OF REGULATORY TAKINGS CLAIMS IN THE AFTERMATH OF
PALAZZOLO
Before the Court decided Palazzolo, there was some disagreement
among state and lower federal courts as to the importance of an owner’s
knowledge of existing laws to the strength of that owner’s ensuing
regulatory takings claim.62 Most courts that had addressed the issue had
held or implied that if property was regulated when an owner acquired it,
then that owner could not reasonably form investment-backed expectations
that the property could be used without limitation. If a government body
later enforced those laws to the detriment of the owner, the owner was
deemed to have factored this possibility into her expectations when she
obtained title to the land, fatally undercutting her takings claim.63
Palazzolo resolved this question but raised another one. By rejecting
the notice rule, a majority of the Justices established that an owner in this
situation is not precluded from bringing a regulatory takings claim later.
But by failing to agree as to how important this owner’s knowledge is, the
Court offered scant—and contradictory—guidance to owners, regulators,
and judges as to just how strong these post-Palazzolo claims are. This Part
will begin to examine that question by distinguishing more finely among
the different types of regulatory takings claims.
The Palazzolo Court made it clear that neither direct condemnation
claims nor inverse physical takings claims can be transferred to successor
owners. The owner at the time of the taking has a claim, and an owner who
later succeeds to title obtains only the bundle of rights that has been reduced
by the taking of some of the prior owner’s property. This second owner
does not own whatever property rights the government previously took and
may not bring a claim for the loss of these rights. Any takings claim has
already been crystallized, the existence of the taking can readily be

61. Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *14 & n.79 (R.I. Super. Ct.
July 5, 2005) (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
62. See supra Part I.
63. For purposes of clarity and consistency, I will refer throughout this Part to the preenactment owner as “he” and the post-enactment buyer as “she.” Note, however, that many owners in
takings cases are actually business entities.
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established before the first owner transfers the property, and the date of the
taking is easy to determine.
Most inverse takings claims, however, are regulatory claims and not
physical ones. Regulatory takings are harder to identify, with the
government usually denying that it has taken property at all. For this reason,
regulatory takings claims must be ripened in accordance with the standard
the Court established in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission
v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City64 and reaffirmed in Palazzolo.65 First, the
owner must obtain a final decision from the administrative body charged
with enforcing the regulation.66 It is nearly impossible for a court to
determine if a regulation has taken property until it knows exactly how that
regulation will be applied to the owner’s land, and the only way to answer
this question is for the owner to apply for a permit and see that application
through to a final decision. Second, if the administrative body ultimately
denies the owner’s permit, the owner must seek compensation at the state
level.67 If the state arbiter denies compensation, then the owner’s federal
claim is ripe. Until that point, a federal court cannot determine whether the
alleged taking is an uncompensated one, and only uncompensated takings
are prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.68
Regulatory takings claims take considerable time to ripen as the owner
develops a detailed factual record. The point during the lengthy ripening
process at which an owner transfers the property to a successor can have a
significant impact on a court’s assessment of the strength of the successor
owner’s expectations under Palazzolo. The remainder of this Part examines

64. Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186–97
(1985). For a general discussion of ripeness in regulatory takings claims, see Gregory M. Stein,
Regulatory Takings and Ripeness, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1995).
65. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618–26 (2001) (applying the Williamson County
ripeness standards); id. at 645–48 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (agreeing that Williamson County applies
but disagreeing with the Court’s application of it); cf. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t
of Envtl. Conservation, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2610 & n.10 (2010) (referring to ripeness questions as not
jurisdictional, with no further discussion or citation of authorities on this point); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l
Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 733–34 (referring to both prongs of the ripeness test as “prudential”).
But see id. at 733 n.7 (referring to ripeness rules as both Article III and prudential mandates).
66. Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 186–94.
67. Id. at 194–97.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation”). The discussion in the text describes the process for ripening as-applied regulatory
takings claims brought against state or local governments in federal court. The ripeness standards
necessarily differ somewhat for claims against the United States, claims brought in state court, and facial
claims.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2003072

690

Vermont Law Review

[Vol. 36:675

claims arising when property is transferred at different points during the
ripening process.
An original owner may not have formulated plans yet for his newly
restricted property. Or he might have just formulated plans but not yet
applied for a permit. This owner may have submitted the permit application
but not yet received a response from the applicable regulatory body. The
owner may have received a preliminary response and begun to negotiate
with that body. The regulatory body may have denied the permit
application, but that denial may be appealable to a higher-level
administrative body, and Williamson County requires not just a decision,
but a final decision. The owner may have received a final decision, thereby
ripening his claim for compensation at the state level, but that state claim
may be pending. Or the state court may have rejected the owner’s claim for
compensation, thereby completing the ripening process for the owner’s
federal takings claim.
The closer the owner is to the beginning of this process, the greater the
remaining uncertainty as to the uses of the land that the government will
ultimately allow. If the owner sells the property to a successor early in the
ripening process, the successor owner may have as much uncertainty as the
original owner did, or nearly as much.69 Moreover, the original owner will
not have had the opportunity to ripen the claim fully, and Palazzolo aims to
protect successor owners most strongly in precisely this situation. A
successor owner in this setting has a relatively strong claim under
Palazzolo: She knows little more than her predecessor did, so her
reasonable investment-backed expectations will differ little from his. Unlike
the prior owner, she knows at the time she acquires the property that a new
law restricts her ability to use it. But like her predecessor, she has little
sense of just how much impact that law will have on her ability to use the
land. A successor owner such as this one is the type most likely to benefit
under the rule of Palazzolo.
Conversely, if the original owner is nearing the end of the ripening
process without success, that owner knows that the permitted uses of his
69. See generally Gregory M. Stein, The Effect of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island on the Role of
Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES 41–74 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002) [hereinafter Stein, Role of Reasonable
Investment-Backed Expectations] (outlining different outcomes that might result from a successor
owner’s acquisition of property at different points in the ripening process); Gregory M. Stein, Takings in
the 21st Century: Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations After Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra, 69
TENN. L. REV. 891, 919–26 (2002) (focusing on claims in which an original owner transfers property to
a successor owner early in the ripening process).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2003072

2012]

The Modest Impact of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island

691

land are considerably more restricted than they used to be. He is running
out of bites at the administrative apple, and most regulatory takings claims
fail. At the same time, the successor owner knows that she is acquiring a
bundle of property rights that is probably more restricted and less valuable
than it used to be. If she pays a reduced price for the property that reflects
the probable negative impact of these restrictions, then any expectations she
may have as to a broader use are not backed by her investment; if she does
not, then those expectations are not reasonable. This is the type of successor
owner who should fare worst after Palazzolo.
To be more precise, this second plaintiff is one who should fare little
better under Palazzolo as it was actually decided than she would have fared
had the Supreme Court decided the case differently and simply affirmed the
opinion of the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The reason for this is that her
claim more closely resembles the direct condemnation and inverse physical
taking claims that the Palazzolo Court confirms are non-transferable.70 If
the predecessor to the party who brings a federal regulatory takings claim
has fully met the Williamson County ripeness requirements before he
transfers the property, then “the fact and extent of the taking are known”
before the transfer of ownership and, “[i]n such an instance, it is a general
rule of the law of eminent domain that any award goes to the owner at the
time of the taking, and that the right to compensation is not passed to a
subsequent purchaser.”71 If, as the Court holds, “[i]t would be illogical, and
unfair, to bar a regulatory takings claim because of the post-enactment
transfer of ownership where the steps necessary to make the claim ripe were
not taken, or could not have been taken, by a previous owner,”72 then the
Court is presumably implying that it would be less illogical and less unfair
70. See generally Stein, Role of Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations, supra note 69, at
49–60 (distinguishing among different types of takings claims based on how far they have progressed in
the ripening process).
71. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001) (citing Danforth v. United States, 308
U.S. 271, 284 (1939)).
72. Id.; see also id. at 635 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[I]f existing regulations do nothing to
inform the analysis, then some property owners may reap windfalls and an important indicium of
fairness is lost.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 641–42 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that the taking was a facial one and thus only the prior owner could bring the claim); id. at 654
n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“If Palazzolo’s claim were ripe and the merits properly presented, I
would, at a minimum, agree with Justice O’Connor, Justice Stevens, and Justice Breyer, that transfer of
title can impair a takings claim.”) (citations omitted); id. at 655 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[M]uch
depends upon whether, or how, the timing and circumstances of a change of ownership affect whatever
reasonable investment-backed expectations might otherwise exist.”); cf. id. at 637 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (arguing that a purchaser’s knowledge of existing restrictions should never be relevant to
that purchaser’s takings claim).
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to bar the transfer of a ripe claim. If the claim is not quite ripe at the time of
the transfer but is nearly so, then Palazzolo does not bar the claim but
should weaken it substantially.
If a successor owner acquires the property midway through the
ripening process—after her predecessor has met only the first half of the
ripeness test—and she then brings a claim in state court seeking just
compensation in an effort to meet the second half of the ripeness test, then
the predecessor’s state claim was already ripe at the time he transferred the
property and the successor’s state compensation claim should be barred
even after Palazzolo. The Palazzolo majority held that a successor owner’s
knowledge of the existence of restrictions is relevant—perhaps even highly
relevant—to the strength of her claim,73 and this owner’s knowledge that
her predecessor did not receive a permit should be fatal to her claim in state
court. The successor is not only aware of the intervening law, she knows as
well that the seller has received a final decision that he does not have
permission to proceed. She cannot seek compensation for a completed
taking from another owner. The prior owner would retain his ripe claim for
compensation, of course, and the parties could factor its value into the sale
price of the property: The purchaser would pay less, and the seller would
receive less while retaining the claim for compensation against the
government that he could still bring in state court. Facial regulatory takings
claims would merit like treatment, since owners who bring these claims are
alleging that the mere existence of the restriction takes property. Thus, any
taking was already complete before the original owner transferred the
property to his post-enactment successor.
The successor owner who acquires the property before the prior owner
has met the first half of the ripeness test is the one who benefits most from
Palazzolo. The prior owner has not yet received a final decision on his
permit application, if he has even applied at all. The earlier in the ripening
process the prior owner is, the stronger the successor’s as-applied claim
should be. The strongest claim should be that of the owner who acquires
property shortly after a new restriction becomes effective, before the prior
owner has formulated any plans for the property and before the agency
implementing the new law has had time to develop an enforcement track
record. Here, the transfer of the property matters least, and Palazzolo

73. Id. at 626–30 (majority opinion).
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suggests that the successor’s reasonable investment-backed expectations
should be least impaired by her knowledge of this new law.74
In summary, even after Palazzolo, most claims brought by owners who
acquired property with knowledge of an existing legal limitation on its use
should not turn out differently. The Justices could not agree on just how
significant this knowledge is, and the murky standard they established
suggests that in most cases, the successor owner’s claim will still be weak.
The Court stated directly that the rule of Palazzolo does not apply to direct
condemnations or to inverse physical takings, because those takings have
already been completed, the original owner has a ripe claim, and that claim
is not transferable to a successor.75 By this reasoning, though, other claims
by successor owners should be similarly barred, including: (i) facial inverse
regulatory takings claims; (ii) ripe as-applied inverse regulatory takings
claims; and (iii) as-applied inverse regulatory takings claims that are unripe
under only the second half of the ripeness test. In the first two of these
cases, the federal takings claim is ripe because the extent of any taking is
already known, and ripe claims cannot be transferred. In the third of these
cases, any potential taking is complete, and the only open question is
whether the state forum will order compensation; thus, the state claim for
just compensation is ripe and similarly non-transferable.
The only claims that should benefit from the rule of Palazzolo are asapplied inverse regulatory takings claims that are unripe under the first half
of the ripeness test. These are claims in which neither the seller nor the
buyer knows exactly how the new law will be applied to the land. The
successor owner’s claim should be strongest in those settings in which the
prior owner’s permit application has progressed the least, if at all.76 This
conclusion becomes critically important in the next Part of this Article,
which examines whether plaintiffs have been succeeding in greater numbers
since Palazzolo. To the extent plaintiffs are faring no better, it may be
because they are bringing exactly the types of claims that this Part has
argued should fare no better.

74. See id. at 627–28 (explaining the importance of the temporal relationships among the enactment
of the regulation, the ripeness of the original owner’s claim, and the transfer to the successor owner).
75. Id. at 628.
76. Stein, Role of Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations, supra note 69, at 57 (footnote
omitted) (“In cases of this type, because ‘an inverse condemnation claim [by the prior owner] alleging a
regulatory taking cannot be maintained,’ the successor’s acquisition of title with knowledge of the
preexisting legal limitation does not act as a complete bar to her successful maintenance of a federal
takings claim.” (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628)).
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IV. PALAZZOLO IN THE LOWER COURTS
This Part examines the extent to which owners are successfully
bringing claims after Palazzolo that would have been barred by the notice
rule in most jurisdictions before Palazzolo. If plaintiffs are prevailing now
in cases they previously would have lost, then Palazzolo had the impact that
landowners desired and worked a dramatically pro-landowner change in the
law. But if most notice-rule claims are unsuccessful even after Palazzolo, it
next becomes necessary to inquire why they fall short.
This last inquiry highlights the significance of the previous Part’s
examination of the relative strengths of different types of regulatory takings
claims. It may be that the parties who have been bringing notice-rule claims
since Palazzolo have not had particularly strong arguments to start with.
These landowners may have raised precisely the types of claims that the
previous Part suggests are the weakest, claims that would have failed before
Palazzolo and that still fail today despite a favorable change in the law.
Although courts frequently cite Palazzolo, fact patterns in which that case
affects the result may arise only rarely. Because Palazzolo is not usually
outcome-determinative, the decision may not be as far-reaching as its
supporters initially hoped. Alternatively, it may turn out that lower courts
pointedly refuse to follow the dictates of Palazzolo, thereby nullifying the
Supreme Court’s opinion. This would be a worrisome result, perhaps
requiring a strong reaffirmation by the Supreme Court.
I have reviewed all of the state and lower federal court cases that cite
Palazzolo. I begin in Part IV.A by providing a numerical overview of these
cases, indicating how many refer to Palazzolo’s discussion of the notice
rule, as opposed to other issues in the case. After paring down the large
number of citing cases to the subset of cases specifically relevant to the
notice-rule issue, I devote the rest of this Part to examining and discussing
the most important of these cases. This discussion seeks to ascertain as
accurately as possible how many cases came out differently as a result of
Palazzolo and to analyze why Palazzolo may not have led to a different
result in some of these cases.
Part IV.B focuses on the small group of cases in which a landowner
would have lost before Palazzolo but now wins her case. For these owners,
Palazzolo provides the welcome change in the law that advocates for
property owners desired. If many influential cases fall into this first
category, then Palazzolo was a seminal decision, changing the outcome for
many property owners that previously would have lost.
Of course, there are likely to be cases in which a landowner that would
have lost before 2001 still loses even now. In these cases, the owner’s claim
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presumably remained too weak even after Palazzolo bolstered it, and the
Court’s opinion had no impact on the ultimate outcome. Parts IV.C and D
examine these cases, with Part IV.C focusing on the earlier cases and
Part IV.D shifting the emphasis to more recent decisions. For the most part,
the earlier cases that Part IV.C describes appear to be claims that were not
strong to begin with. Part III demonstrated how the combination of
Palazzolo and the Court’s ripeness rules render some claims much weaker
than others under the current interpretation of the notice rule. Despite the
Court’s statement that knowledge of pre-existing land use limitations is not
a complete bar to the owner’s claim, some claims are destined to fail even
when boosted by arguments that Palazzolo now allows. Stated differently,
the refusal by many courts to consider certain arguments prior to Palazzolo
did not harm some plaintiffs in the end—their claims fail even after
Palazzolo.
Part IV.D turns to more recent cases. Some of the plaintiffs in these
cases present stronger facts, raising the question of whether the deciding
courts intentionally disregarded Palazzolo and thus effectively nullified the
Supreme Court’s holding. Palazzolo strengthens the position of owners, and
presumably some owners that would have lost earlier should prevail now as
a result of that case. There are observers who believe that some of the more
recent cases fall into this category and that improper behavior by judges
barred some claims that should have succeeded. This subpart focuses
closely on two of these recent cases and examines whether courts follow the
rule of Palazzolo and properly arrive at the same result they would have
reached prior to that case or whether they ignore law they should follow.
Finally, there might be cases in which a landowner would have won
even before Palazzolo. That landowner presumably wins today as well,
since Palazzolo further strengthens her case. For example, the plaintiff
might have presented two alternative arguments, and the argument that did
not raise notice-rule issues would have persuaded a court to rule in her
favor even before Palazzolo despite whatever problems the notice-rule
argument presented. Or perhaps the case arose in a jurisdiction such as
Michigan, in which state courts were already following a rule similar to that
of Palazzolo.77 For cases that fall into this category, Palazzolo is not
outcome-determinative, and the owner will presumably continue to prevail
after Palazzolo reinforces her winning argument. Palazzolo is not
77. See, e.g., Guy v. Brandon Township, 450 N.W.2d 279, 285–86 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (per
curiam) (rejecting a self-created hardship defense).
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significant to cases that fall in this category for the simple reason that it is
redundant. Part IV.E examines these cases and also considers a handful of
others that do not fit neatly into any of the categories described above.
A. Looking at the Numbers
According to a KeyCite analysis of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island that I
have updated through April 20, 2012, state and lower federal courts have
cited the case 492 times.78 Of the cases that cite Palazzolo, a small number
proved to be erroneous citations in which a court referred to another case
but mistakenly listed reporter and page numbers that fall within the range of
the Palazzolo opinion. I discounted cases that appear to be trivial, including
those in which Palazzolo is cited to bolster a proposition that is well
supported by other cases. For instance, a fairly large number of cases refer
to Palazzolo merely for general principles of takings law, such as the fact
that the Fifth Amendment has been incorporated against the states.79
Palazzolo addresses three distinct issues: whether the claim was ripe,
whether Palazzolo’s notice of land use limitations in effect on his
acquisition date barred his claim, and whether he had established a total
taking of his property. This Article seeks to determine the impact of the
decision on later cases that raise the second of these three issues. Thus, I did
not include in my analysis cases that address only the other issues. Several
cases discuss the notice rule in passing but then proceed to resolve other
issues. I did not include in my final numerical totals any of these cases in
which the notice rule was not a significant issue.80 I also disregarded factual

78. It is possible that this search missed cases in which Palazzolo’s holding changed the
outcome but the court failed to cite the case, or failed to cite it accurately. There is no feasible way to
measure the size of this effect, but it is probably slight. It is unlikely that any court would decide a case
involving the notice rule after Palazzolo without actually citing that case, if for no other reason than the
fact that the landowner’s lawyer would emphasize it in her arguments to the court.
79. See, e.g., Whittaker v. County of Lawrence, 674 F. Supp. 2d 668, 679 (W.D. Pa. 2009),
aff’d, No. 10-1138, 2011 WL 2745815 (3d Cir. July 15, 2011); Trakansook v. Astoria Fed. Savings &
Loan Assoc., No. 06-CV-1640, 2007 WL 1160433, at *3 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2007), aff’d, No. 072224-cv, 2008 WL 4962990 (2d Cir. Nov. 21, 2008).
80. I did, however, include cases in which Palazzolo is cited only in a concurrence or a dissent,
in the belief that the decision of the court may have been affected by these other opinions even though
the main opinion does not directly cite the case. The judges in the majority probably responded to the
Palazzolo argument at some level even if they did not say as much.
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outliers that are unlikely to have much future impact on regulatory takings
doctrine.81
Of the 492 total citations, only 113 rely on Palazzolo to any significant
extent for the purpose of resolving a notice-rule question. Moreover, in
several instances, multiple opinions from within this group turned out to be
the same case at different stages in the proceedings, such as an intermediate
court opinion, a state supreme court reversal, and then a lower court opinion
on remand. After consolidating all of these cases, the net number of state
and lower federal court opinions to cite Palazzolo for purposes of resolving
a notice-rule dispute is actually 100.
The case evaluations that follow require some judgment calls and a bit
of guesswork. Some of the post-Palazzolo opinions address proceedings
early in the litigation process, such as appellate court review of a lower
court’s granting of a motion for summary judgment, and end with the
appeals court remanding the case for further proceedings that are never
reported or that may still be underway. Some of these opinions offer
alternative rationales for their holdings, making it difficult to assess the
extent to which Palazzolo affected the outcome. In some, the factual
presentation and legal analysis are inadequate for the reader to be able to
determine reliably how the case might have fared before Palazzolo.
Nonetheless, I seek here to make these appraisals as accurately as possible, in
an effort to establish just how much of an impact Palazzolo has had and why.
B. Cases in Which Palazzolo May Have Changed the Outcome:
A Landowner That Would Have Lost Before Now Wins
From the group of 100 relevant cases, I have found a maximum of
fifteen—and possibly as few as three—in which Palazzolo may have been
81. Some of these cases, while citing to Palazzolo, present fact patterns that are highly atypical
of regulatory takings cases. See, e.g., Page v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 328, 340 (2001) (rejecting a
claim that a regulatory change increasing the minimum square footage per ostrich egg in a quarantine
station constitutes a regulatory taking), aff’d, 50 F. App’x 409 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Sands N., Inc. v. City of
Anchorage, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1040–41 (D. Alaska 2007) (rejecting a claim that a minimum fourfoot separation between patrons and dancers in an adult entertainment establishment constitutes a
regulatory taking); Church of Universal Love & Music v. Fayette County, No. 06-872, 2008 WL
4006690, at *14 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2008) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment on a
regulatory takings claim arising from a county’s failure to issue a zoning exception to a church and
noting that the church’s website acknowledges that it became a church, in part, to circumvent local
zoning rules); Sharma v. Johnston, No. 10-21560-Civ-LENARD, 2010 WL 5579885, at *14 (S.D. Fla.
Dec. 13, 2010) (rejecting a claim by a physician imprisoned for improperly prescribing drugs that the
revocation of his medical license constitutes an uncompensated taking).
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outcome-determinative. These are cases in which the plaintiff probably or
certainly would have lost before Palazzolo but wins afterwards as a direct
result of the Court’s decision. The reason I present this figure as a range of
numbers is that it is impossible to deduce how the court would have ruled
before Palazzolo in most of the cases in this group. Courts do not ordinarily
state how they might have decided a case if the law had taken a different
path, and there are only three cases among these fifteen in which the court
states explicitly that it held differently than it previously would have
because of Palazzolo.82 The claimants in the remaining cases thus might
have prevailed even before Palazzolo, which means that in as many as
twelve of these cases the Supreme Court’s opinion may have changed
nothing. For purposes of the discussion in this subpart, I have erred on the
side of overinclusivity, counting all fifteen cases in an effort to assess the
maximum impact that Palazzolo may have had.
These fifteen cases are largely unremarkable. More than half of these
opinions come from trial courts, including state trial courts, federal district
courts, and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. Most of these cases did not
generate published appeals or have not yet done so. Several cases present
odd fact patterns that are unlikely to recur often and thus are of little
precedential value. Most have been cited by other courts infrequently, with
a few never having been cited at all. In short, there are only three reported
cases nationwide since 2001 in which Palazzolo unquestionably changed
the outcome in favor of the owner; there are twelve more in which
Palazzolo may have changed the outcome or it is difficult to determine one
82. Heaphy v. State, No. 03-45407-AA, 2004 WL 5573600 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept. 15, 2004)
(expressly amending its findings in light of Palazzolo), aff’d on other grounds, Heaphy v. Dep’t of
Envtl. Quality, No. 257941, 2006 WL 10064442 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2006); see discussion infra
notes 111–13 and accompanying text. Hinz v. City of Lakeland, No. A06-1872, 2007 WL 2481021, at
*7 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2007) (rejecting a city’s notice-rule defense in light of a recent Minnesota
case that expressly overruled pre-Palazzolo state case law that had adopted the notice rule; the court
concurrently reversed the trial court’s finding that there was a categorical taking and remanded for
further findings as to whether there was a Penn Central taking); see discussion infra note 119 and
accompanying text. Woodland Manor III Assocs. v. McCleod, 786 A.2d 1075, 1075–76 (R.I. 2001)
(reversing a prior holding in favor of the state in light of the intervening Palazzolo decision and
remanding to Superior Court), after remand as Woodland Manor, III Assocs. v. Reisma, No. C.A.
PC89-2447, 2003 WL 1224248, at *5 (R.I. Super. Feb. 24, 2003) (allowing a successor owner’s claim to
proceed because a government request that a new development application be filed was still outstanding
at the time of the transfer of the property and plaintiff thus alleged injury-in-fact); see discussion infra
note 119 and accompanying text. A fourth case arguably falls into this category as well. Philip Morris,
Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 33 n.5 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that a law requiring disclosure of trade secrets
would work a regulatory taking even if a tobacco company knew of the statute at the time it invested in
and developed the trade secret at issue).
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way or the other; and none of these fifteen can be considered an important,
consequential case within the overall body of regulatory takings law.83
Note that in several of these cases, the impact of Palazzolo may have
been more subtle. These are cases in which the rule of Palazzolo allowed a
claim that would have failed early in the proceedings to survive longer, and
a final resolution was never published or the case is still in progress. It is
possible that these claimants lost in the end or ultimately will lose, which
means that the Palazzolo holding will have had no impact on the final
outcome. It is also possible, however, that as a result of Palazzolo, some of
these landowners settled or will eventually settle on terms that are more
favorable than they otherwise would have received. I address this topic in
greater detail below.84 These few cases in which Palazzolo may have
provided a more concealed benefit to the landowners, however, are largely
insignificant in that most present atypical facts or unusual analysis and have
been cited rarely or never.
Typical of the fifteen cases in this category is MHC Financial Limited
Partnership v. City of San Rafael, an unreported case from the Northern
District of California, in which the court cites Palazzolo’s notice-rule
holding in evaluating a claim of reasonable investment-backed expectations
and rejects the city’s motion for summary judgment.85 The court, citing to
the Palazzolo majority, states directly that it fears “put[ting] an expiration
date on the Takings Clause” and holds that the owner’s knowledge of
existing law as of its acquisition date does not automatically bar its claim.86
The owners ultimately prevailed in this case at the trial level,87 and the city

83. Other commentators have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., John D. Echeverria,
Making Sense of Penn Central, 39 ENVTL. L. RPTR. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,471, 10,476 (2009)
(“Surprisingly, given the sturm und drang generated by repudiation of the notice rule, Palazzolo has had
remarkably little impact on day-to-day litigation. Takings claims brought by purchasers with notice
continue to be rejected on a fairly routine basis.”).
84. See infra Part V.
85. MHC Fin. Ltd. P’ship v. City of San Rafael, No. C 00-3785 VRW, 2006 WL 3507937,
at *11–12 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2006). Note that the caption of this case appears to be incorrect, and the
name of the plaintiff actually is “MHC Financing Limited Partnership.” Id. at *1.
86. Id. at *11 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001)); id. at *12
(“[A]lthough relevant, notice of the ordinance does not foreclose MHC’s Penn Central claim.”); id. at
*13 (denying the city’s summary judgment motion “[d]ue to the innumerable factual questions entailed
in this inquiry”). Note that the case involved several other issues, and the court did grant summary
judgment to the city on some of them. Id. at *15.
87. MHC Fin., Ltd. v. City of San Rafael, No. C-00-03785 VRW, 2008 WL 440282, at *35–38
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2008). Once again, the caption of this case appears to be incorrect.
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has appealed to the Ninth Circuit.88 It is impossible to determine from the
court’s opinions whether the owners would have fared equally well even
before Palazzolo, although it is at least possible that Palazzolo is the reason
the owner’s takings claims survived the government’s summary judgment
motion.
Similarly, in Ciampi v. Zuczek, a case arising in the same town as
Palazzolo, the defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
owner was not entitled to compensation for a taking that occurred prior to
his ownership, and the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island
rejected the motion.89 The court offers two reasons. First, the court observes
that the defense presupposes that the only type of taking that might have
occurred is a physical occupation.90 This portion of the court’s opinion
appears to assume that a regulatory taking should be treated differently in
that the claim might pass to a successor owner, just as Palazzolo holds.
Second, the court observes that the defense presumes but has not yet
established that any taking occurred prior to the plaintiff’s ownership.91
Given the factual uncertainties presented, the court denied defendants’
motion for summary judgment.92
Part of the problem the Ciampi court faces is an absence of facts at
such an early stage of the proceedings. Note, however, that the court’s
reference to the question of whether the taking occurred before or during
the time the plaintiff owned the property implies that a claim asserting a
taking beforehand would be barred under the notice rule while a claim
alleging a taking during the plaintiff’s ownership would not. In the former
case, the court suggests that the notice rule would apply and bar the claim,
while in the latter case, the claim could proceed but the notice rule would
not be relevant at all. If both of these statements are accurate, then
Palazzolo did not affect the outcome. However, given that Palazzolo might
allow the plaintiff’s claim to proceed on at least one of the possible sets of
facts, the Supreme Court’s decision may have permitted this particular
claim to survive longer than it otherwise would have.

88. Notice of Appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit of Final Judgment and
Interlocutory Orders, MHC Fin. Ltd. P’ship v. City of San Rafael, No. 3:00-cv-03785 (9th Cir. Jul. 8,
2009), ECF No. 620.
89. Ciampi v. Zuczek, 598 F. Supp. 2d 257, 267 (D.R.I. 2009).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 268.
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In Rucci v. City of Eureka,93 another plaintiff’s claim survived in
federal district court longer than it might have prior to Palazzolo. The
plaintiff in Rucci held only a contractual right to acquire the subject
property rather than fee simple title.94 After concluding that this contractual
right constitutes property that is protected by the Takings Clause, the
Eastern District of Missouri denied defendant’s motion for summary
judgment.95 Note that the plaintiff here raised only a claim that he had been
deprived of all economically viable use of the property he had contracted to
buy.96 Thus the case addresses just the question of whether an owner who is
aware of legal limitations on the use of his land may nonetheless recover for
a Lucas-type taking.97
The Court of Federal Claims has reached results similar to those
observed in these federal district courts. In McGuire v. United States, the
court recites that there is “no ‘blanket rule’ that prevents a claimant from
challenging a regulation of property that was in effect at the time the
claimant acquired an interest in the property,”98 while acknowledging that
existing rules do factor into an owner’s expectations.99 The court concludes
that summary judgment on the question of plaintiff’s partial regulatory
takings claim is premature, given factual disagreements between the
parties.100 In particular, a significant factual issue appears to have been
whether the government misled the owner into believing that he had greater
rights than he actually had, rather than just the question of whether the
government could legally impair his property rights.101 Although there is
some implication in the opinion that the notice rule would have barred the
owner’s claim otherwise, the owner’s claim may have lasted longer than it
might have before the decision in Palazzolo.
93. Rucci v. City of Eureka, 231 F. Supp. 2d 954 (E.D. Mo. 2002).
94. Id. at 955.
95. Id. at 957–58.
96. Id. at 956.
97. Id. at 956–57. A claimant raising a Lucas claim cannot recover if “the proscribed use
interests were not part of his title to begin with.” Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027
(1992). Thus, pre-existing limitations on title may serve as a bar to claims of total takings. See generally
Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles As
Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 322 (2005) (describing how Lucas has
led to an increase in categorical defenses to takings claims).
98. McGuire v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 425, 441 (2011) (quoting Rith Energy, Inc. v. United
States, 270 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001))).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 441–42.
101. Id.
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Under a strong version of the notice rule, a plaintiff’s knowledge of
laws in existence at the time she acquired her property would prove fatal to
her claim that a regulation unconstitutionally impaired her reasonable
investment-backed expectations. If the Supreme Court had adopted such a
rule, then the courts in all four of the cases just described could well have
dismissed the landowners’ claims at an early stage. The fact that all four
claimants prevail—or at least endure—as a result of judicial opinions that
cite Palazzolo suggests that that case might have altered the outcomes.
These four opinions are all from trial courts, and only one of them has
any subsequent published history. Collectively, courts have cited these
cases a total of nine times since they were published, and seven of those
citations are by other trial courts. In short, these four cases in which
Palazzolo might have changed the outcome have had little influence on the
overall body of regulatory takings law. Despite their limited impact, these
four cases are representative of the fifteen I have located in which Palazzolo
may have allowed a notice-rule claim to succeed or survive longer than it
would have under a contrary rule. The remaining eleven cases are similarly
insignificant in that they involve fact patterns or judicial discussions that are
atypical or present more common fact patterns but have been cited
infrequently or never.
For example, in Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. United States, the
United States, as defendant, may have been committing an ongoing taking
by virtue of its failure to dispose of spent nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste.102 The Court of Federal Claims held that a successor
owner of a nuclear power plant may have a viable takings claim against the
government.103 The court allowed the successor’s claim to proceed despite
the successor’s acquisition of the property with knowledge of the
government’s omission and knowledge that the prior owner had already
brought a takings claim of its own.104 This is an unusual fact pattern that
arose in one group of closely related cases but is unlikely to appear again.105

102. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 431, 433 (2005).
103. Id. at 442.
104. Id. at 441–42 (granting original owner’s motion for joinder and thereby allowing successor
owner to pursue its own separate takings claim; original owner’s claim, arising out of pre-transfer
omissions by the government, is not transferable, but original owner may continue to pursue it).
105. More than sixty similar cases have been filed by other entities that are parties to similar
contracts. Id. at 433. However, this fact pattern is quite unusual when viewed in the context of regulatory
takings law overall and is unlikely to arise again in the future once this group of cases is resolved.
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Similarly, in Carpenter v. United States, the same court denied
defendant’s motion to dismiss, citing Palazzolo.106 The court initially
appears to interpret the motion as arguing that plaintiff’s knowledge of
existing law “preclude[d]” her takings claim, and therefore had no choice
but to deny the motion.107 Later in the opinion, the court softens its
understanding of defendant’s argument, noting defendant’s position that
plaintiff’s acquisition of the property after the enactment of the restrictive
law is only “relevant” to her expectations.108 The court denied the motion,
noting that “the prior enactment of the legislation does not, in and of itself,
cut off plaintiff’s right to pursue her Penn Central claim at this early
stage.”109 Like Rochester Gas & Electric, this case is one of a group of
cases presenting an issue that is unlikely to arise in the future.110
Two other unusual cases arose in state trial courts. A Michigan trial
court, in Heaphy v. State, seems to have misread the rule of Palazzolo—
under which claims arising from pre-acquisition regulation are not
automatically barred—to require the court to find a taking affirmatively.111
That court’s three-paragraph opinion includes the following statement:
“Palazzolo . . . clearly held that plaintiff’s acquisition of Lot 3 after the
adoption of the restrictive legislation does not bar his taking claim.
Accordingly, this Court does hereby amend its findings and further
determines plaintiff’s damages are to include Lot 3.”112 Although the court
had apparently found a taking with respect to two other lots already, it
completely disregarded any negative impact the owner’s knowledge of the
intervening laws may have had on her expectations with respect to the third
lot. Recall, however, that Michigan is a state that was more inclined to

106. Carpenter v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 718, 731–32 (2006) (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001)).
107. Id. at 730.
108. Id. at 732.
109. Id.
110. Carpenter involves a takings challenge to legislation that limits prepayment of certain
mortgage loans designed to encourage the provision of rental housing for low- and moderate-income
families. Id. at 720–22. The potential compensation awards in this case and in others raising similar
challenges are quite large, but once this group of related cases has been resolved, similar cases are
unlikely to arise in the future.
111. Heaphy v. State, No. 03-45407-AA, 2004 WL 5573600, slip op. at 2 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept.
15, 2004), aff’d on other grounds, Heaphy v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, No. 257941, 2006 WL 1006442, at
*1 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2006).
112. Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2003072

704

Vermont Law Review

[Vol. 36:675

follow a rule similar to that of Palazzolo even before the Supreme Court
decided that case.113
In Middleland, Inc. v. City Council of New York, a case that seems to
raise a Lucas-type taking, the court found a regulatory taking by the city
against an owner that acquired the property with notice of a restrictive
declaration severely limiting the owner’s use of the property.114 The
offending declaration, apparently adopted privately to satisfy a condition to
an earlier rezoning, required the land to be used as an accessory parking lot
for an IBM manufacturing facility that had since closed.115 The court order
invalidated and canceled the declaration but did not require the city to pay
compensation to the owner.116
Unusual fact patterns and legal analyses such as these are unlikely to
arise in future regulatory takings cases, making it improbable that these
opinions will be influential in the future. In fact, Carpenter, Heaphy, and
Middleland have never been cited in another published judicial opinion.
The other cases in this category are also factually atypical, inconsequential,
or both. For example, one case involves a transfer from one trust to another
with no new beneficiaries.117 The court in that case held that Palazzolo does
not bar the successor trust from bringing a claim but nevertheless reversed
the lower court’s finding of a taking and remanded the case for further
factual determinations.118 Five of the remaining six cases are similarly
unusual or unremarkable.119 The last of the fifteen cases in this category—
113. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
114. Middleland, Inc. v. City Council, No. 6281/2006, 2006 WL 3956610, at *9 (N.Y. Sup. Dec.
22, 2006).
115. Id. at *4.
116. Id. at *9.
117. Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751, 762–63 (Pa. 2002).
118. Id. at 775–76.
119. Res. Invs., Inc. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 447, 524–25 (2009) (denying both parties’
motions for summary judgment so that the court may consider further the reasonableness of the owner’s
expectations, given that the owner proposed to operate in the heavily regulated solid-waste disposal
industry); Hinz v. City of Lakeland, No. A06-1872, 2007 WL 2481021, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 31,
2007) (rejecting a city’s notice-rule defense in light of a recent Minnesota case that expressly overruled
pre-Palazzolo state case law that had adopted the notice rule; the court concurrently reversed the trial
court’s finding that there was a categorical taking and remanded for further findings as to whether there
was a Penn Central taking); Woodland Manor III Assocs. v. McCleod, 786 A.2d 1075, 1075–76 (R.I.
2001) (reversing a prior holding in favor of the state in light of the intervening Palazzolo decision and
remanding to Superior Court), after remand as Woodland Manor, III Assocs. v. Reisma, No. C.A.
PC89-2447, 2003 WL 1224248, at *5 (R.I. Super. Feb. 24, 2003) (allowing a successor owner’s claim to
proceed because a government request that a new development application be filed was still outstanding
at the time of the transfer of the property and plaintiff thus alleged injury-in-fact); Varner v. City of
Knoxville, No. E2003-02650-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2309142, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2004)
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the only one in this group to be decided by a federal appeals court—
addresses trade secrets rather than real property.120
C. Early Cases in Which Palazzolo Did Not Change the Outcome:
A Landowner That Would Have Lost Before Still Loses
A considerably larger number of cases—at least forty-seven and
possibly as many as fifty-three—appear to be notice-rule disputes in which
Palazzolo did not change the outcome. In these cases, the relevant court
ruled against the landowner and probably would have reached the same
result even if Palazzolo had never been decided or if the Palazzolo Court
had instead affirmed the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s strong version of
the notice rule.121 This number should be more reliable than the number I
reached in Part IV.B. While it is often impossible to discern how a court
would have ruled had the law been different,122 the cases discussed below
are all cases in which the landowner ultimately lost even after benefiting
from the rule of Palazzolo. Since Palazzolo can only strengthen a
landowner’s argument, plaintiffs who lost after that case was decided most
likely would have lost beforehand.123 Palazzolo interprets regulatory takings
law in a way that helps certain plaintiffs, but it did not help these particular

(vacating the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of a landowner due to uncertainty
as to why the court granted it, while acknowledging the relevance of Palazzolo); City of Sherman v.
Wayne, 266 S.W.3d 34, 47 (Tex. App. 2008) (finding “no significance” in a city’s argument that a party
acquiring land after a regulation becomes effective cannot maintain a regulatory takings claim).
120. Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 33 n.5 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that a law
requiring disclosure of trade secrets would work a regulatory taking even if a tobacco company knew of
the statute at the time it invested in and developed the trade secret at issue).
121. See supra Part II.
122. Again, courts are sometimes quite clear that they would have ruled in favor of the
government whether or not the landowner could benefit from Palazzolo arguments. See, e.g., Rith
Energy, Inc. v. United States, 270 F.3d 1347, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (denying, shortly after Palazzolo, a
petition for rehearing from a party against whom it had ruled two months before the Supreme Court
decided that case).
123. Note that a small number of cases in this group actually present plaintiffs who won their
cases. These are cases in which the prevailing plaintiff is the pre-enactment owner, rather than the
person to whom that party transferred title later. I include these cases in this group because they appear
to follow the pattern set forth in Part III, and they state or imply that the post-enactment transferee
would not have prevailed. See, e.g., Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 129–30 (2005) (holding
that a sale by a property owner after his claim against the government for contamination of groundwater
by pesticides had fully accrued does not deprive that former owner of his claim); S. Lyme Prop. Owners
Ass’n v. Town of Old Lyme, 539 F. Supp. 2d 524, 536 (D. Conn. 2008) (allowing prior owner to bring a
facial claim while noting that the current ownership of the land is irrelevant).
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plaintiffs enough.124 Despite the greater confidence the reader can have in
the numbers presented in this subpart, some observers still might quibble
with the numbers I provide here. My count represents my best estimate of
how many cases have been decided since Palazzolo in which that case,
while pertinent, probably did not change the outcome.
Not only is the number of cases in this category at least triple the
number in the previous category and perhaps considerably higher, these
cases are also far more weighty and noteworthy. A handful of these cases
have been particularly influential, cited frequently and often helping to
frame the outcome in subsequent cases. Many present fact patterns that are
fairly typical of regulatory takings cases, which means that similar fact
patterns are likely to arise in the future and give other courts further
opportunities to cite these influential precedents. Several were decided by
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, perhaps the most important
court in the regulatory takings field other than the Supreme Court. In short,
not only are there far more cases in which Palazzolo, while on point, did
not affect the final outcome of a dispute, these cases are also considerably
more significant within the overall body of regulatory takings law.
This subpart examines some of the earlier post-Palazzolo cases from
the Federal Circuit and the Court of Federal Claims, continues with an
important 2002 case from the Ninth Circuit, and then addresses selected
cases from the state courts and from federal district courts. Part IV.D
continues the discussion of cases in which a post-Palazzolo plaintiff loses
by returning to two important later cases, one from the Ninth Circuit125 and
the other from the Federal Circuit.126
Typical of the important and weighty earlier cases are Rith Energy, Inc.
v. United States127 and Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States,128 both decided
by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit soon after Palazzolo. In
Rith, the court had originally held before Palazzolo that a coal mining
company did not have reasonable investment-backed expectations that it
would not be subject to the restrictions set forth in the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA)—enacted eight years before Rith
124. See supra notes Part III.
125. Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 2455 (2011).
126. CRV Enters., Inc. v. United States, 626 F.3d 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 2459 (2011).
127. Rith, 270 F.3d at 1347.
128. Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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acquired interests in the coal leases at issue—in light of the heavily
regulated nature of the coal mining industry.129 This opinion relied heavily
on three earlier cases from the Federal Circuit.130 Two months after the
court’s initial decision in Rith, the Supreme Court decided Palazzolo, and
Rith petitioned for a rehearing.131
The Federal Circuit summarizes Rith’s position as follows: “The
implication of Rith’s argument seems to be that in assessing Rith’s
investment-backed expectations, it was improper for this court to assign any
weight to the regulatory regime established by SMCRA.”132 The court
responds that, even after Palazzolo rejected a broad interpretation of the
notice rule, “the Court did not suggest that the reasonable expectations of
persons in a highly regulated industry are not relevant to determining
whether particular regulatory action constitutes a taking.”133 This is
particularly true in an industry such as coal mining: “A party in Rith’s
position necessarily understands that it can expect the regulatory regime to
impose some restraints on its right to mine coal under a coal lease.”134
Before Palazzolo, the court had ruled in favor of the United States on the
basis of precedent within the circuit, and “we do not believe [those cases]
have been undermined by the Supreme Court’s decision in Palazzolo.”135
Rith has since been cited in thirty-six judicial opinions, including six from
the Federal Circuit and one from the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts.136
Appolo, also arising under SMCRA, is in accord. After reviewing and
reaffirming its holding in Rith, the Federal Circuit continues by stating,
“[l]ikewise, we conclude that Appolo’s reasonable investment-backed
expectations are shaped by the regulatory regime in place as of the date it
129. Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 247 F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
130. Id. (citing and discussing cases and the relevant provisions of SMCRA).
131. Rith, 270 F.3d at 1347 (petition for rehearing en banc).
132. Id. at 1350.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1351. See generally Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 1, 13 (2003) (“Mere application of existing principles, even vague ones such as the rules of
nuisance, to new circumstances should not be enough [to support a regulatory takings claim].”); Eric D.
Albert, If the Shoe Fits, [Don’t] Wear It: Preacquisition Notice and Stepping into the Shoes of Prior
Owners in Takings Cases After Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 758, 766 (2003) (“To
be efficient, a scheme of compensation to alleviate the burdens of a legal transition requires an inquiry
into whether those affected knew beforehand what its impact would be.”).
135. Rith, 270 F.3d at 1353.
136. E.g., Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Gove v. Zoning
Bd. of Appeals, 831 N.E.2d 865 (Mass. 2005).
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purchased the leases at issue.”137 The prior existence of SMCRA does not
automatically doom Appolo’s claim, but it does reduce Appolo’s
expectations. The court concludes “that Appolo’s lack of reasonable
investment-backed expectations is coupled with government action
designed to protect health and safety. As in Rith, we think that these factors
taken together outweigh Appolo’s economic injury, even if it was
severe.”138
Other Federal Circuit cases reach similar results for similar reasons.
For example, in Norman v. United States, the court found no taking even
after Palazzolo because the owners “purchased most of the land with full
knowledge that portions of it were not subject to development.”139 And in
Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, the same court held that a
heliport operator had no property right in navigable airspace over the
nation’s capital, and thus the Federal Aviation Administration deprived the
owner of nothing compensable when it imposed more stringent restrictions
on helicopter flights after September 11, 2001.140
Cases from the Court of Federal Claims are in accord. That court relied
heavily on Rith and Appolo in Cane Tennessee, Inc. v. United States.141
Cane Tennessee was yet another case raising notice-rule issues under
SMCRA, and the court held that the coal company’s uncertainty as to this
restrictive law’s applicability “served to enlarge the risks associated with
pursuing an investment in mining operations.”142 This uncertainty actually
undercut the plaintiff’s argument that it enjoyed reasonable investmentbacked expectations that it would be permitted to mine.143 In Arctic King
Fisheries, Inc. v. United States, the same court held that, while the plaintiff
held no property right in pollack fishing licenses that were revoked, it did
own the fishing vessel that was affected by these revocations.144 However,
137. Appolo, 381 F.3d at 1349.
138. Id. at 1351 (citation omitted). Also relevant is Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States,
271 F.3d 1327, 1341–57 (Fed. Cir. 2001), which reaches a similar result relying in large part on a due
process analysis. The Appolo court clarifies that the Commonwealth Edison discussion of reasonable
investment-backed expectations applies equally well to takings claims. Appolo, 381 F.3d at 1349 n.5.
139. Norman v. United States, 429 F.3d 1081, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
140. Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1219–20 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Although this claim involved the question of whether there was a property right at all, the plaintiff had
raised the issue of whether its alleged property right was limited by virtue of the fact that it acquired this
right with knowledge of the existing regulatory regime governing public airspace. Id. at 1210–12.
141. Cane Tenn., Inc. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 715 (2005).
142. Id. at 730.
143. Id.
144. Arctic King Fisheries, Inc. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 360, 371 (2004).
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reasonably foreseeable changes in this heavily regulated industry did not
work a regulatory taking of this trawler.145 Commenting on the plaintiff’s
adoption of a fishing strategy that led it to lose its licenses, the court states,
quite bluntly, “Plaintiff gambled . . . and it lost.”146 The same court also
recognized, in Palm Beach Isles Associates v. United States, that the
existence of the federal navigational servitude is a defense to a takings
claim brought by an owner that wished to construct a residential housing
development on a small parcel of upland adjacent to submerged land that it
also owned.147
The Ninth Circuit, which faces a high volume of regulatory takings
cases, is in accord. In Daniel v. County of Santa Barbara, prior owners had
offered in writing to dedicate an easement for bicycles and pedestrians
across the property at issue.148 The county accepted one of these offers after
the successor owners acquired the property.149 The successors brought a
regulatory takings claim, which both the Central District of California and
the Ninth Circuit rejected.150 The appellate court held that the county took
nothing of value from the successor owners but merely exercised a written,
recorded option that had been granted by the earlier owners.151 In the
court’s words, “[t]he Daniels . . . cannot, by virtue of their purchase, obtain
greater rights than those held by their predecessors in interest.”152
The court indicates that this is a claim of either a regulatory or a
physical taking, although it finds the former argument more plausible.153 If
this was a regulatory takings claim, then the first of the two ripeness prongs,
requiring finality, was met when the prior owner received an administrative
affirmance of the 1974 exaction.154 As for the second prong, which
demands that the owner pursue just compensation in a state forum, the
resolution depends on whether California then had procedures in place for
providing such compensation. If it did, then no one has pursued these
145. Id. at 385.
146. Id. at 380.
147. Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 657, 686–87 (2003) (holding that the
existence of the navigational servitude is a complete defense to a taking of submerged land and that the
adjacent upland’s proximity to the submerged land, rather than the permit denial itself, caused the loss of
the upland’s value), aff’d without opinion, No. 04-5047, 122 F. App’x 517 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 23, 2005).
148. Daniel v. County of Santa Barbara, 288 F.3d 375, 378 (9th Cir. 2002).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 384.
152. Id. at 382.
153. Id. at 380–81.
154. Id. at 380–82.
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procedures, the claim never ripened, and the limitations period for pursuing
compensation has expired. If it did not, then pursuit of compensation was
impossible and therefore not required, and the claim is similarly timebarred.155 Alternatively, the Daniels’ claim could be construed as the
physical taking of an option for an easement. In this alternative, the
physical taking meets the first ripeness prong, and analysis of the second
prong is the same as if this were a regulatory taking, meaning that the claim
once again fails for limitations reasons.156
The court squarely rejects the argument that the county’s exercise of
the option after the transfer of the property creates a new cause of action for
the successor owners.157 The taking—if there was one—occurred at the time
the option was granted, and the most recent option was granted in 1987.158
“Thus, when the Daniels purchased the property from the Bucklews, the
offers to dedicate the easement had already been taken from their
predecessors in interest, and the County’s acceptance of one of those offers
took nothing from the Daniels that had not already been taken.”159 The
Daniels presumably paid a price that reflected the reduction in property
value caused by the recorded option.160
The Ninth Circuit addresses Palazzolo directly, noting:
Palazzolo rejected the state court’s “blanket rule” that
would have found no taking whenever a purchaser was aware of
existing land-use regulations that reduced the market value of
property. But Palazzolo did not adopt the converse of that rule.
That is, it did not adopt a rule that would find a taking whenever
there are pre-existing restrictions on land use that reduce market
value. If that were the rule, no land-use restriction would ever be
safe from a takings challenge.161

The different sequence of steps in Daniel and Palazzolo is thus quite
significant, as Justice O’Connor had previously emphasized in her

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 381–82.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 382–84.
Id. at 382–83.
Id. at 383.
Id.
Id. at 384.
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Palazzolo concurrence.162 In Palazzolo, any regulatory taking would be
completed in the future, when the government applied the relevant
regulations to the successor owner in a particular way, and the notice rule
would not necessarily bar the successor’s claim. Here, by contrast, any
taking, whether regulatory or physical, had been completed in full many
years earlier, before the Daniels acquired the property. “Because the full
value of the easement had already been taken from the Daniels’
predecessors, [the County] took nothing of value from the Daniels.”163
The Ninth Circuit’s discussion here is precisely in accord with the
analysis I endorsed in Part III of this Article and which I argued is implicit
in Palazzolo itself. If there was an uncompensated physical taking, as may
have been the case in Daniel, then the County fully completed its offending
act many years ago. The taking was complete then, and a non-transferable
takings claim belonged to the owner at the time of the taking and is now
time-barred. A regulatory taking, by contrast, may have been completed, or
the permitting process may still be in progress. If a regulatory taking has
been completed, as also may have happened in Daniel, then the owner of
the property at that time holds the non-transferable takings claim, which has
now expired, just as if the claim were a physical one. If the permitting
process is ongoing or if it has not yet even begun, then the new owners may
complete the application process, ripen their claim, and pursue it.
State court cases similarly recognize and apply the rule of Palazzolo
while continuing to find in favor of the government defendant. In Serra
Canyon Co., Ltd. v. California Coastal Commission, the California Court of
Appeal faced facts similar to those in Daniel and cited that case with
approval while distinguishing Palazzolo much as Daniel had.164 And just as
in Daniel, the Serra Canyon facts are exactly in accord with the analysis in
Part III. “The land use regulations challenged in Palazzolo had the potential
to later effect a regulatory taking, once a specific proposal from a new
owner was rejected. Here, Adamson acquiesced in the state’s imposition of
a condition, and accepted the benefit of the permit to which the condition
attached.”165 In short, the current owner simply never owned the property
right in question:
162. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632–33 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The more
difficult question is what role the temporal relationship between regulatory enactment and title
acquisition plays in a proper Penn Central analysis.”).
163. Daniel, 288 F.3d at 384.
164. Serra Canyon Co. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 110, 115–16 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
165. Id. (citation omitted).
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By accepting title to property with full knowledge that it is
subject to an existing, recorded [restriction], a landowner cannot
claim that the exercise of the [restriction] amounts to a “taking.”
To secure a benefit . . . , the prior landowner conveyed away the
very interest that the present owner now claims is being
“taken” . . . .166

Dayspring Development, LLC v. City of Little Canada applies a similar
analysis.167 In Dayspring, the original owner transferred the subject
property to a limited liability company after the city had first denied plat
approval and then rescinded the regulation in question.168 The temporary
takings claim was thus ripe when the prior owner still owned the property,
and the issue was whether the successor owner could pursue the claim.169
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota saw the case as similar to a physical
taking because of the completion of all acts that were necessary to effect the
purported taking, just as Part III recommends.170 The court held that only
the prior owner could pursue the claim, although it did imply that an
affirmative assignment of the claim might suffice to transfer it to the
successor owner.171
In McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the South Carolina
Supreme Court, deciding the case for a second time after the U.S. Supreme
Court vacated and remanded the state court’s earlier opinion in light of
Palazzolo, again found no taking.172 Prior state law held that the state holds
presumptive title to submerged land just below the high water mark for the
benefit of the public.173 This rule applies to dry land that becomes
submerged after acquisition.174 McQueen purchased two lots that eroded
significantly after he acquired them.175 The court found no taking even after
the state denied McQueen’s applications to backfill the lots and build
166. Id. at 116.
167. Dayspring Dev., LLC v. City of Little Canada, No. A09-2289, 2010 WL 3306926 (Minn.
Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2010).
168. Id. at *5.
169. Id. at *4.
170. Id. at *4–5.
171. Id. at *5; see also Stein, supra note 10, at 160–61 (discussing whether a claim that is
unquestionably held by only the prior owner can be affirmatively transferred to the successor if the
parties so agree).
172. McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 117, 120 (S.C. 2003).
173. Id. at 119–20.
174. Id. at 120.
175. Id.
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bulkheads on them, because the state law rules inhered in McQueen’s title
even though his land was upland when he bought it.176
And on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Superior Court of
Rhode Island gave an overwhelming list of reasons why Palazzolo himself
lacked reasonable investment-backed expectations that he could build on
his land, despite the High Court’s ruling in his favor on the notice-rule
question.177 The court concluded that “despite wishful thinking on
Palazzolo’s part, he paid a modest sum to invest in a proposed subdivision
that he must have known from the outset was problematic at
best. . . . Constitutional law does not require the state to guarantee a bad
investment.”178
These last two opinions provide the clearest possible examples of cases
in which Palazzolo had no impact on the result, given that each court
reaffirmed a pre-Palazzolo holding in favor of the government on remand
after Palazzolo was decided.179 The reasoning by the state courts may have
differed somewhat before and after Palazzolo, but the Supreme Court’s
holding did not affect the ultimate result.180 Other state court results are
similarly unchanged by Palazzolo.181
176. Id.
177. Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *14 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5, 2005).
178. Id. (footnote omitted).
179. Id. (“Palazzolo’s reasonable investment-backed expectations were modest.” (footnote
discussing Justice O’Connor’s Supreme Court concurrence omitted)); McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 120. “We
find no compensation is due. After reconsideration in light of Palazzolo, we reach the same conclusion
we originally reached in this case . . . .” Id.
180. Of course, landowners litigating since Palazzolo are less likely to lose on pure notice-rule
grounds and more likely to lose (if, in fact, they do lose) because they are unable to show an
unconstitutional impairment of their reasonable investment-backed expectations. To the extent that more
owners survive longer, this may strengthen all owners’ positions in settlement negotiations and may
encourage more flexibility by regulatory bodies earlier in the land use process. In that sense, it is an
overstatement to claim that Palazzolo had no impact at all on their claims. See infra Part V.
181. See, e.g., McDowell Residential Props., LLC v. City of Avondale, No. 1 CA-CR 09-0301,
2010 WL 2602047, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 29, 2010) (holding that a prior owner has standing to
bring an inverse condemnation claim when it had assumed the costs in connection with the value lost by
a subsequent owner that acquired the property with notice of an intervening dedication requirement);
Cole v. County of Santa Barbara, No. 01003407, 2001 WL 1613856, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2001)
(holding that a prior owner acquiesced in a restriction and accepted benefits in return, and that the
successor owner loses not because it was on notice of this restriction, but because the prior owner had
already conveyed away the very right in question); Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.
2d 623, 638–39 (Minn. 2007) (holding that, although Palazzolo overruled a state case to the contrary,
this owner had no reasonable investment-backed expectations that it could use the property for anything
other than a golf course; any losses were caused by general market conditions and not by the city);
Miskowiec v. City of Oak Grove, No. A04-82, 2004, WL 2521209, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2004)
(citing both Palazzolo and earlier state cases as holding that a regulatory taking does not occur until the
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Federal district courts also cite Palazzolo while finding for the
government. In Committee for Reasonable Regulation of Lake Tahoe v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, for example, the court applied a method
of analysis similar to that seen in Rith and Appolo, but here to residential
property.182 Despite the fact that the plaintiff organization represented
homeowners rather than coal companies, the court emphasizes that
“purchasers of land in the Tahoe Basin have known of the tremendous
power conferred on TRPA by Nevada, California and the Federal
government since at least 1980.”183 The court feels comfortable treating
residential development as a heavily regulated industry in this context,
concluding that “this information was public knowledge and the average
purchaser of land in the Basin, and particularly the shoreland, should have
adjusted her investment backed expectations accordingly.”184 Dozens of
other cases from state and federal courts throughout the country, though
less weighty or presenting facts that are not as directly on point, have
reached similar results.
D. More Recent Cases in Which Palazzolo Did Not Change the Outcome:
Are the Lower Courts Following Palazzolo’s Dictates?
Part IV.C demonstrated that a substantial number of state and federal
courts across the nation have reached results in notice-rule cases that, while
cognizant of the Palazzolo rule, are no different than they would have been
before that case was decided. As that subpart showed, many of these cases
are straightforward takings cases that are fairly typical. In some of the
leading cases, courts have analyzed these claims precisely as Part III argues
that they should: The more the government’s actions look like a direct
taking or an inverse physical claim, the less likely it is that an owner will
win a takings claim that raises notice-rule issues. While different people
will disagree as to whether the Court reached an appropriate result in
Palazzolo or whether the lower courts have been applying that case
plaintiff has exhausted all administrative remedies; even though the law in question predates the
plaintiffs’ ownership of land, they were the owners who obtained the final administrative denial and thus
may bring the claim, which fails on the merits); Johns v. Black Hills Power, Inc., 722 N.W.2d 554, 558
(S.D. 2006) (holding that a physical trespass was completed before the plaintiff acquired the property, the
purchase price reflected the resulting diminution in value, and any claim belongs to the prior owner).
182. Comm. for Reasonable Regulation of Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 311 F.
Supp. 2d 972, 992–98 (D. Nev. 2004).
183. Id. at 996.
184. Id. at 996–97.
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properly, it seems apparent that the claims landowners are losing tend to be
the weakest claims with the least favorable facts.
Two significant recent cases merit particular attention here:
Guggenheim v. City of Goleta,185 an en banc decision from the Ninth
Circuit, and CRV Enterprises, Inc. v. United States,186 arising in the Federal
Circuit. In both of these cases, the landowner lost and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari. In Guggenheim, these results ensued despite a blizzard of
extremely supportive briefs in both the case and the petition for certiorari
from property rights organizations well acquainted with the process of
litigating regulatory takings claims. These supporting documents raise the
question of whether these two important circuit courts have been applying
Palazzolo correctly or, as the owners and some of their supporters argued,
failing to apply it in cases in which they should have.
The facts of Guggenheim present some quirks that, while unusual, did
not prove determinative of the outcome. Santa Barbara County imposed a
mobile-home rent-control ordinance many years before the Guggenheims
purchased their mobile-home park.187 Five years after the Guggenheims
acquired their property, the city of Goleta incorporated itself on territory
from within the county that included the Guggenheims’ land.188 As a result
of the incorporation process, the county’s mobile-home rent-control
ordinance may technically have lapsed for a matter of hours before being
re-adopted by the new city.189 The Guggenheims subsequently brought a
facial challenge to the new ordinance, but not an as-applied challenge,
claiming an uncompensated taking.190 After a fairly protracted course of
litigation, a Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court’s granting of the
city’s motion for summary judgment, but the court sitting en banc vacated
that decision and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment
for the city.191
The en banc court ruled in favor of Goleta, distinguishing Palazzolo,
because of the important distinctions between facial claims such as this one

185. Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 2455 (2011).
186. CRV Enters., Inc. v. United States, 626 F.3d 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 2459 (2011).
187. Guggenheim, 638 F.3d at 1113–14.
188. Id. at 1115.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1116.
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and as-applied claims such as Palazzolo.192 The court frames this distinction
correctly, again in accordance with the analysis that Part III sets forth:
This difference matters because an as applied challenge
necessarily addresses the period during which the administrative
or judicial proceedings for relief occur, so justice may require
that title transfers during the ripening period not bar the action.
By contrast, there is no such extended period applicable to a
facial challenge, because the only time that matters is the time the
ordinance was adopted.193

The Guggenheims were not challenging the earlier county ordinances. Had
they done so, they would have been bringing a notice-rule challenge to laws
existing at the time they acquired their property. Rather, they challenged the
re-adoption of this ordinance by the city after they already owned the
property. So to some extent, this case looks like it falls outside of the
category that is the subject of this Article.194 Moreover, they brought only a
facial challenge, reserving any possible as-applied claims for the future.
Nonetheless, the earlier county ordinances are relevant to the extent
they helped to shape the Guggenheims’ expectations as to the use of their
land, and it is for this reason that the case truly does raise issues of notice
and expectations. The slight gap before the new city’s rent-control
ordinance took effect is of no import, since the Guggenheims’ expectations
had already been formed years earlier: Any short-lived change in the law
during the transition from control by the county to control by the new city
took place long after the Guggenheims had made the investment that
established their reasonable investment-backed expectations. The
Guggenheims may have speculated back then that rent control would end
some day, but the Takings Clause protects only “the property we have, not
the property we dream of getting.”195 If there was any possible compensable
facial taking, it was suffered by the prior owners many years earlier.196
192. Id. at 1118–22.
193. Id. at 1119.
194. “Palazzolo v. Rhode Island is of no help to the Guggenheims. They do not have the
problem that Palazzolo solved.” Id. at 1118 (footnote omitted).
195. Id. at 1121.
196. Id. at 1121–22. The Ninth Circuit also distinguishes Guggenheim from Palazzolo by noting
that the Guggenheims purchased their land in an ordinary business transaction, while Palazzolo acquired
his parcel as a result of the dissolution of the corporate former owner. Id. at 1118. Thus the
Guggenheims planned their transaction and developed reasonable investment-backed expectations,
while Palazzolo simply succeeded to ownership, much like one who takes property under a will. Id.
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In CRV, the plaintiffs owned nine acres adjacent to a man-made slough,
which gave them riparian rights under California law.197 In 1999, as part of
an environmental cleanup of a nearby parcel, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) issued a Record of Decision (ROD) under which it decided
to install a log boom that would prevent navigation along part of the
slough.198 In 2002, one of the plaintiffs acquired the subject property from
its prior owner, after a series of negotiations among seller, buyer, and EPA
failed to result in an agreement that would allow the plaintiffs to build the
marina development they planned.199 The plaintiffs then brought an inverse
condemnation claim against the United States.200 The parties initially agreed
to a dismissal of the claim without prejudice, given that the remediation
plan had not yet been implemented.201 When the log boom was finally
constructed in 2006, the plaintiffs again filed suit against the United States
in the Court of Federal Claims.202
The trial court held, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, that there was no
physical taking because none of the remediation structures were physically
located on CRV’s property.203 The log boom and anchors all were erected in
the slough itself, which CRV did not own, and government action that
limits the use of water without removing it is not a taking.204 As for CRV’s
regulatory takings claim, the Federal Circuit concluded that CRV did not
own the property at the time the taking is alleged to have occurred, and thus
it lacked standing to bring a claim.205 This result is dependent on the court’s
holding that the taking, if any, occurred in 1999, when EPA issued its ROD,
and not seven years later, when the log boom was actually built.206 The
issuance of the ROD represented EPA’s final decision, which means that
the claim accrued and ripened then, and only the owner at the time of the
taking—the prior owner—can bring the claim.207
(noting that Palazzolo, unlike the Guggenheims, had not “bought the property for a low price reflecting
the economic effect of the regulation”).
197. CRV Enters., Inc. v. United States, 626 F.3d 1241, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert denied, 131
S. Ct. 2459 (2011).
198. Id. at 1244.
199. Id. at 1244–45.
200. Id. at 1245.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1245–48.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1248–50.
206. Id. at 1250.
207. Id; see also Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 129–30 (2005) (holding that a sale by
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One of the briefs supporting CRV’s unsuccessful petition for certiorari
argues that the court’s opinion contradicts Palazzolo by denying some
parties that take title after a regulation is adopted the ability to challenge
that regulation.208 The brief notes that the Federal Circuit “considered”
Palazzolo but then reached a contradictory conclusion without any
citations.209 This holding, the brief continues, “contravenes Palazzolo,
threatens fundamental rights, and demands reexamination,”210 and
“abrogates” Palazzolo and is “irreconcilable” with it.211 In short, the brief is
accusing the Federal Circuit of misreading, or possibly even nullifying, a
Supreme Court case.212
This brief misunderstands the types of claims that Palazzolo and CRV
raised, as Part III of this Article emphasizes. In CRV, the claim ripened
while CRV’s predecessor still owned the property. Because any taking has
already occurred, the owner at the time of the alleged taking can be
determined, the statute of limitations has started to run, and the government
will need to pay interest on any award running from this date until the time
of payment. Any taking, in short, is complete, and the claim cannot be
transferred.213 In Palazzolo, by contrast, the prior owner had not yet ripened
a claim at the time Palazzolo succeeded to ownership, and the predecessor
thus could not have brought a takings claim. This means that the only way
to avoid putting an “expiration date” on the Takings Clause is to allow the
successor owner to pursue a building permit if he chooses and, if he is
unsuccessful and does not receive compensation at the state level, to bring
an as-applied takings claim in federal court.214
a property owner after his claim against the government for contamination of groundwater by pesticides
has fully accrued does not deprive that former owner of his claim).
208. Brief for Cato Inst. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, CRV Enters., Inc. v.
United States, 626 F.3d 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 10-1151), 2011 WL 1536717, at *6, *10.
209. Id. at *10.
210. Id. at *11.
211. Id. at *19.
212. The accusation applies to the Ninth Circuit as well, since the brief also notes the same
concerns with that court’s Guggenheim holding. Id.
213. The Assignment of Claims Act prohibits the transfer or assignment of any claim against the
United States. Assignment of Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3727 (2006), cited in CRV, 626 F.3d at 1249 n.7,
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2459 (2011).
214.
Were we to accept the State’s rule, the postenactment transfer of title would
absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting land use, no
matter how extreme or unreasonable. A State would be allowed, in effect, to put
an expiration date on the Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule.
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001).
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There is room for disagreement about whether the issuance of the ROD
in this case was enough of a government action to complete a taking. That
portion of the holding, in fact, is somewhat troubling in light of the parties’
earlier stipulation that the claim was not ripe at that point, raising the
question of whether the government is now estopped from arguing
otherwise.215 The court concludes, however, that the plaintiff simply did not
own the property at the time of the taking, when the ROD was issued.216
And there is case law support in the Federal Circuit for the position that the
issuance, rather than the implementation, of an ROD is the relevant date for
determining the time of a taking.217 The taking occurred in full before CRV
owned the property, and only the owner at that time may bring the claim
arising from this completed taking. In sum, the stipulation as to ripeness is
immaterial to the case, as CRV acquired the property after the taking had
already been completed. The ROD may have taken property, but it did not
take property from CRV.218
The nullification point is an important one, however, and merits
additional discussion. This Part has noted the large number of influential
cases in which Palazzolo, though important to various courts’ discussions,
had no apparent impact on their results. One plausible inference from these
opinions is that Palazzolo was not as significant a case as observers initially
believed, just as this Article suggests. Another possible implication of these
cases, raised by the brief in support of CRV, is that these courts are
ignoring the rule of Palazzolo and instead reaching a result that they prefer
despite incompatible case law from the U.S. Supreme Court.219
An examination of the many regulatory takings cases decided since
Palazzolo offers scant support for this second possible conclusion. To begin
with, it is unlikely that such a large number of judges from state and federal
courts around the country would all hold an important Supreme Court case
in such low regard that they would refuse to follow it, not to mention their
judicial oaths. The opinions ruling in favor of governments even after
215. CRV, 626 F.3d at 1248–49.
216. Id. at 1250.
217. Id. at 1249–50 (citing Goodrich v. United States, 434 F.3d 1329, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
218. Id. at 1250 (“That claim, if it existed, was owned by the prior owner.”).
219. Those who argue in support of a strong “judicial takings” doctrine raise similar arguments.
See, e.g., Michael J. Fasano, A Divided Ruling for a Divided Country in Dividing Times, 35 VT. L. REV.
495, 503 (2010) (bemoaning the ways in which “‘result-oriented’ decisions found in the jurisprudence of
a jurisdiction” can “mangle precedent in order to enable a court to reach a preordained decision, often
from a desire to achieve a particular state policy objective” and arguing that “such decisions could be
utilized to nullify takings claims legitimately grounded in reversals of existing precedent”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2003072

720

Vermont Law Review

[Vol. 36:675

Palazzolo provide lucid discussions of the case and typically distinguish it
in ways that this Article argues are completely proper. The judges plainly
take their roles seriously and seek to justify difficult decisions in settings in
which both sides make credible arguments. That is what judges are
supposed to do, and, whatever the results, some observers are going to be
every bit as unhappy as the non-prevailing party presumably is. Multi-judge
appeals courts or appellate panels rendered many of these opinions without
any dissent, and some of these opinions come from courts that are widely
viewed as receptive to regulatory takings claims from landowners. It is
unlikely that more than 100 judges from across the country—a group that
had little or no choice in finding regulatory takings cases on their dockets—
would all decide to nullify Palazzolo so soon after it was decided.
Of all the cases to cite Palazzolo in that time, I have found only three
in which a credible argument can be made that the court nullified that case.
I have just noted two of these cases: Guggenheim and CRV. While CRV was
a unanimous opinion from a three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit,
Guggenheim came from a far more fractured court. That case was initially
decided in favor of the landowners by a divided three-judge panel of the
Ninth Circuit, and the final opinion reversing the panel was issued by a
divided court sitting en banc, with a strongly worded dissent authored by
Judge Bea and joined by Chief Judge Kozinski and Judge Ikuta. The third
case, Prosser v. Kennedy Enterprises, Inc., comes from the Supreme Court
of Montana, and I will discuss it below.220
The dissenters in Guggenheim do not mince words. Judge Bea begins
his detailed dissent, which is considerably longer than the court’s opinion,
by stating that “the majority misapplies the Supreme Court’s analysis of
regulatory takings claims. It ignores two essential elements of that analysis,
and fails to follow the Court’s instructions on the one element it uses to
disqualify the claim.”221 Focusing more directly on the majority’s Palazzolo
analysis, Judge Bea accuses the court of “ignor[ing]” it.222 Later on, in his
analysis of the majority opinion, he disagrees with the court’s distinction
between facial and as-applied cases, stating that the court is raising factual
differences that are immaterial to the analysis, “no more significant than
that the Palazzolo land was in Rhode Island and the Guggenheim land was
in California,” and with “no justification or legal support for why these

220. Prosser v. Kennedy Enters., Inc., 179 P.3d 1178 (Mont. 2008).
221. Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Bea, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 1123–24.
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proposed distinctions matter.”223 The dissent states that the court dismisses
one of the landowners’ contentions “without any citation of authority . . .
(without a citation to any case, statute, or even a law review article).”224 In
addition, “the majority, perhaps sensing its vulnerability . . . , attempts to
distract the reader by introducing an entirely irrelevant consideration into
the analysis.”225 In the summary of his analysis of investment-backed
expectations, Judge Bea describes the majority as adopting “a static and
somewhat simplistic view of law, politics, and economics.”226
These are strong words, accusing the majority of incompetence at best
and intellectual dishonesty at worst. They also misunderstand the court’s
analysis. A majority of the judges sitting en banc, like so many of the other
judges in the cases discussed above, merely acknowledged the timing and
sequencing issues that are so essential in determining whether a notice-rule
case succeeds or fails. In Palazzolo, the key transfer of property occurred
during the time when the as-applied claim was ripening, which means that
only the successor owner could bring the claim.227 The prior owner did not
have a claim that was ripe before it transferred the land to Palazzolo. And as
noted above, “[t]his difference matters because an as applied challenge
necessarily addresses the period during which the administrative or judicial
proceedings for relief occur, so justice may require that title transfers during
the ripening period not bar the action.”228 Palazzolo should not necessarily
win his case on the merits, but it would be unfair to disqualify him on
notice-rule grounds from bringing his claim when his predecessor never had
a ripe takings claim that it could bring.
The Guggenheims, by contrast, challenged only the city law that took
effect after they owned the property, and they challenged it only facially.229
Because they owned the property before the city law took effect,
Palazzolo’s discussion of the notice rule is off the point. But if that city law
merely re-enacted an earlier identical county law that predates the
223. Id. at 1129 (footnote omitted).
224. Id. at 1130.
225. Id. at 1131 (referring to the reasonable investment-backed expectations of the mobile-home tenants).
226. Id. The dissent’s use of the term “static” is puzzling. Elsewhere, the dissent accuses the
court of “adopting a view of the law and of the economic effects of the Goleta ordinance that is static
and provides no opportunity for change or innovation.” Id. at 1124. Yet the dissent’s approach, which
would require the city to pay the Guggenheims for the effect of a change in the law, would certainly
limit change more than the court’s actual holding does.
227. Id. at 1119 (majority opinion) (discussing Palazzolo).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1118–19.
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Guggenheims’ acquisition of title, the facial claim belongs to the prior
owner and is non-transferable. Many of the cases that I discuss above, from
a wide variety of jurisdictions, support this type of analysis, which also
accords with the argument Part III presents and with Palazzolo itself.
The Guggenheim dissenters undoubtedly have strong feelings about
this case, which led them to deliver such a strongly worded dissenting
opinion. But this court is no more fractured than the Supreme Court was in
Palazzolo itself, when it authored six opinions disagreeing about the extent
to which an owner’s notice of laws existing at the time he acquired title
should impair his reasonable investment-backed expectations. A majority of
the Ninth Circuit followed an analytical pattern that flows naturally from
Palazzolo and that many courts throughout the country have adhered to in
their own discussions. The Guggenheim dissenters’ intimations that the
majority sought to nullify Palazzolo are incorrect and unfair.
Prosser v. Kennedy Enterprises, Inc., the only other case in which a
nullification argument could plausibly be made, presents odd facts and a
majority opinion that may simply have misapplied Palazzolo.230 The case is
factually atypical in that it is a claim raised by neighbors of a casino who
argued that a city’s approval of that casino violated city ordinances and
constituted a nuisance.231 It is not a takings claim at all, and Palazzolo is
cited only because Prosser purchased her property after the city adopted the
resolution approving the casino.232 In fact, the court cites Palazzolo merely
for the proposition that an award of compensation belongs to the owner at
the time of the taking, suggesting that Prosser is the wrong plaintiff.233 The
only justice to raise the notice-rule issue is one of the dissenters.234 He
suggests that some of the diminution in the value of Prosser’s property
occurred after she acquired the property and that it was impossible to assess
the actual loss until later, when the city failed to take action against the
casino.235 The majority seems to believe that Prosser’s claim is not viable
because she was aware of the city’s actions at the time of her acquisition, a
view that might contradict Palazzolo. The dissent sees her claim as a
formerly unripe one that now has become viable under Palazzolo. This

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Prosser v. Kennedy Enters., Inc., 179 P.3d 1178 (Mont. 2008).
Id. at 1180–81.
Id. at 1182.
Id.
Id. at 1199 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
Id.
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unusual case is hardly evidence of widespread nullification by American
courts.236
E. Other Types of Cases
This subpart examines other cases that cite Palazzolo’s notice-rule
holding and that do not fall into either of the two categories examined
above. Keep in mind that Parts IV.B and C sought to be overly inclusive,
which means that some of the cases considered there may not actually have
fallen into the categories addressed in those subparts. The parties or the
court did not provide enough facts or analysis for the reader to be able to
decide for certain, and I included them in those subparts and not in this one
because I did not wish to overlook any cases that may have been relevant
there. The cases discussed in this subpart, by contrast, almost certainly do
not fall into either of those earlier two categories.
For the most part, the cases addressed in this subpart are so unusual
and inconsequential that they merit and receive little attention here. They do
not fit within either of the more important categories discussed above, their
facts or legal arguments are atypical of regulatory takings claims, they offer
little insight into the ongoing impact of Palazzolo on the lower courts, and
they are unlikely to have any significant influence on regulatory takings law
in the future. In some of these cases, the court appears to have misread or
misapplied Palazzolo. And in some of these cases, the plaintiff would have
prevailed even before Palazzolo, so it is relatively pointless to examine the
effects of a case that further strengthens a legal argument that was already a
winner. I present this very brief subpart to point out that not every case fits
neatly into one of the two opposing categories described above, emphasize
that some cases are out of the ordinary, and allow each reader to assess for
themselves whether they agree with the way in which I have categorized the
many cases that cite Palazzolo.
In Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Brainard, for example, some of
the regulatory restrictions impairing the plaintiff’s use of its land predated
its acquisition of ownership while other restrictions did not.237 In addition,
there was a question as to whether the federal court had supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law takings claim.238 The court’s somewhat
236. Prosser has been cited in a total of 12 judicial opinions, all from state and federal courts in Montana.
237. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Brainard, No. 1:06-cv-0825-DFH-TAB, 2007 WL
4232184, at *12–13 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 28, 2007).
238. Id. at *11.
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confusing opinion addressing this unusual combination of facts denies
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, leaving open the possibility that
notice-rule issues might arise later in the proceedings.239
Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island is a case in which the
state adversely possessed the plaintiff’s land, and the plaintiff brought a
takings claim seeking compensation.240 The state defended unsuccessfully
by arguing that the owner knew that the law of adverse possession was an
underlying state law principle.241 In other words, landowners in Rhode
Island can bring inverse condemnation claims against the government if the
government adversely possesses their property. However, because the
plaintiff here delayed too long in bringing its takings claim against the state,
that claim was time-barred.242 And in United States v. 191.07 Acres of
Land, the court focuses on the notice rule at the compensation phase of a
takings claim.243 The court cites Palazzolo while noting that the
determination of the highest and best use of the property for purposes of
determining just compensation factors in pre-existing laws.244
Some notice-rule cases fail on ripeness grounds, thereby depriving the
court of the opportunity to reach the substantive takings issue.245 Others
question whether the plaintiff has a sufficient property right to be able to
bring a claim at all.246 These cases, only some of which even raise obvious
notice-rule issues, are just too unusual to be of much use for purposes of
assessing the impact of Palazzolo.
There is one other relatively insignificant group of cases for which
Palazzolo did not change the outcome. In these cases, the plaintiff would
have prevailed even before Palazzolo was decided, and the extra arrow in
its quiver that Palazzolo provides has no impact on the result. For example,
239. Id. at *14.
240. Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 217 F. Supp. 2d 206, 209 (D.R.I. 2002),
aff’d, 337 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2003).
241. Id. at 226.
242. Id. at 228–29.
243. United States v. 191.07 Acres of Land, 482 F.3d 1132, 1136–38 (9th Cir. 2007).
244. Id. at 1137–38.
245. See, e.g., Schooner Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 373, 384 (2010),
aff’d without opinion, No. 2010-5134, 2011 WL 1491338 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 20, 2011) (per curiam).
246. See, e.g., Gebman v. New York, No. 07-cv-1226, 2008 WL 2433693, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. June
12, 2008) (holding that a contract vendee does not have standing to bring a claim); Kobobel v. State
Dep’t of Natural Res., 249 P.3d 1127, 1139 (Colo. 2011) (en banc) (holding that well owners do not
have a constitutionally protected property right in the water from their wells); Gacke v. Pork Xtra, LLC,
No. LACV019489, 2001 WL 35818480, at n.1 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Aug. 1, 2001) (noting that the takings
compensation owed to a lessee is limited to the value of the remaining term of the lease), rev’d on other
grounds, 684 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa 2004).
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in State ex rel. Shemo v. City of Mayfield Heights, the Supreme Court of
Ohio partially granted the city’s motion for reconsideration but noted that
even if a Palazzolo analysis applies, the court’s original holding of a taking
remains valid.247 The landowner won before, and the city’s belief that
Palazzolo might warrant reconsideration by the court was “misplaced.”248
In Pulte Land Co. v. Alpine Township, the Court of Appeals of Michigan
upheld the trial court’s finding of a taking despite the township’s notice-rule
defense.249 The appeals court relies heavily on pre-2001 Michigan cases,
citing Palazzolo only once,250 and also refers to the successor owner’s
purchase for only $5,000 as “no investment to speak of” and “essentially
receiv[ing] the property as an inheritance.”251 Recall that Michigan is a state
in which landowners generally fared well even before Palazzolo.
KCI Management, Inc., v. Board of Appeal is in agreement.252 In KCI,
the court held that a post-enactment buyer can maintain an as-applied
challenge to the validity of a zoning law that was already effective when it
purchased the property, citing to both Palazzolo and earlier Massachusetts
case law.253 Finally, note the odd case, East Cape May Associates v.
Department of Environmental Protection, in which the plaintiff actually
prevailed before Palazzolo but then suffered a partly unfavorable remand
afterwards, a result that initially seems puzzling given that Palazzolo
strengthens the legal position of landowners.254 Although the court correctly
applies Palazzolo’s notice-rule holding, the court appears to have remanded
in part because it disagreed with the lower court’s application of substantive
regulatory takings law.255 To the extent the owner’s legal position was
actually worsened after Palazzolo, it was not as a result of the notice-rule
portion of that case’s analysis.

247. State ex rel. Shemo v. City of Mayfield Heights, 775 N.E.2d 493, 495–96 (Ohio 2002).
248. Id. at 496.
249. Pulte Land Co. v. Alpine Township, Nos. 259759, 261199, 2006 WL 2613450, at *6
(Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2006) (per curiam).
250. Id. at *3–4 (relying primarily on Michigan cases that predate Palazzolo).
251. Id. at *6.
252. KCI Mgmt., Inc. v. Bd. of Appeal, 764 N.E.2d 377 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).
253. Id. at 380–81 (citing a Massachusetts case that predates Palazzolo).
254. E. Cape May Assocs. v. State Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 777 A.2d 1015 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2001).
255. Id. at 1024, 1032 (finding that “[t]he trial court’s determination that ECM’s property has
been ‘taken,’ . . . ignores fundamental regulatory taking principles” and citing Palazzolo’s non-noticerule holdings for support).
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V. THE OVERALL EFFECT OF PALAZZOLO
As this Article has shown, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island has had only a
minimal impact on decisions by state and lower federal courts addressing
the notice rule. Part IV.B reviewed the relevant cases and demonstrated that
at most fifteen cases—and possibly as few as three—have turned out
differently because of Palazzolo and that none of these cases has been
particularly weighty. Conversely, Part IV.C found between forty-seven and
fifty-three cases, many of them quite prominent, in which Palazzolo did not
change the result. These were all cases in which Palazzolo was sufficiently
relevant that the court cited it as part of a discussion of the notice rule, but
they were also cases in which a post-enactment buyer did not prevail. That
subpart and the following one proceeded to discuss the leading cases from
among this group of far more influential holdings.
Because I have erred on the side of inclusivity in interpreting cases in
Part IV.B, I may actually be overstating the impact of Palazzolo. Many of
the cases that subpart addresses—perhaps as many as twelve of the
fifteen—arguably did not turn out differently after Palazzolo. I arrived at
the number fifteen only by assuming, for cases in which the fact
presentation or legal analysis was incomplete, that the plaintiffs would have
lost these cases before 2001. Moreover, in several of those opinions, the
court remanded the case for further proceedings that were never reported or
have not yet concluded. We do not know whether the landowner ultimately
will or did prevail, or on what terms. It is entirely possible that some of
those plaintiffs survived longer only to lose anyway or to settle on terms
that were not particularly favorable. Thus the number fifteen is a maximum,
perhaps overstating the true number considerably.
Conversely, although Part IV.C also required judgment calls as to what
might have happened if the law were different, the cases noted there are all
cases in which the plaintiff lost. While it may be similarly difficult to know
precisely how some of the cases in this category would have turned out
before Palazzolo, it is largely accurate to describe these cases as litigation
in which the owner lost even after making a Palazzolo argument. It is a safe
assumption that any landowner that loses a notice-rule case after Palazzolo
would have lost that same case before. In none of these opinions did
Palazzolo transform what would otherwise have been a loss into a victory.
Although Palazzolo has plainly had only a modest impact on the
outcomes of reported cases, I want to be careful not to overstate my
argument. The Supreme Court’s collection of opinions may well have
changed the legal background against which all parties involved in the land

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2003072

2012]

The Modest Impact of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island

727

use process operate. A judge becomes involved in a land use dispute only
when the lengthy process of negotiation and litigation finally brings a ripe
case to her docket. Many parties navigate their way through the
administrative stages of the permitting process for years, and it is likely that
Palazzolo has shifted the center of gravity toward owners in these
administrative negotiations.256
To be more precise, the perception by participants in the land use
process that Palazzolo favors owners more than prior law did—a perception
that this Article has shown to be largely inaccurate—may have caused
government officials to favor owners more than they did previously.
Owners may well believe themselves to be in a position of greater strength
as a direct result of Palazzolo. Government officials sitting across the table
from them may share that view. Some of these officials surely became more
inclined to award variances or conditional use permits to owners whose
applications had previously been turned down, and some owners whose
administrative appeals were denied may have received just compensation
sooner and without a fight.
Moving back earlier in the process, it is entirely possible that officials
involved in making initial permitting decisions became more likely to
award permits to applicants after Palazzolo, and to do so earlier in the
process than they had before, out of concern that any refusal was more
likely to lead to a just compensation award after that case was decided.
Moving still earlier in the process, it is also possible that owners who might
have decided not to pursue a permit before 2001 became more assertive
after that date. These owners might have believed that they were more
likely to receive the permit they desired if they were making the request of
an official with a newly augmented fear of liability. Moving even earlier, it
is possible that prospective buyers who would not have purchased particular
parcels in the past, because they knew that their awareness of existing
restrictions could impair their likelihood of receiving a permit or prevailing
on a takings claim, will buy that land today. They may have concluded that
they will receive either the permit they desire or a compensation check from
the government. And moving still earlier, it is even possible to imagine that
legislators began drafting laws differently in light of Palazzolo. In other
words, it is not possible to assess the complete effect of Palazzolo without
knowing how thousands of individual permit applications around the
256. For an early discussion of how Supreme Court cases influence local land use decisions, see
Ann E. Carlson & Daniel Pollak, Takings on the Ground: How the Supreme Court’s Takings
Jurisprudence Affects Local Land Use Decisions, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103 (2001).
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country have progressed over a period of years, and it would be virtually
impossible to gather detailed nationwide information of this type.
At the same time, it is also possible that these perceptions favoring
landowners throughout the process will now begin to reverse themselves, if
they have not already begun to do so. Those permit applicants who were
buoyed by the Palazzolo holding and have been negotiating since then from
a position of greater strength may realize, after reviewing evidence such as
that presented in this Article, that their newfound muscle is illusory.
Conversely, those government officials who have become more
apprehensive about denying permits to applicants since Palazzolo may
awaken to the fact that their position has not been weakened as much as
they initially thought.
What this Article does show is that trial and appellate courts around the
nation have been reaching the same results in the notice-rule cases they
decided after 2001 as they had in the cases they decided before that date.
Most regulatory takings plaintiffs have always lost their cases, and most
regulatory takings plaintiffs continue to lose their notice-rule claims even
after Palazzolo. Before Palazzolo, a certain type of knowledge was
automatically fatal to an owner’s claim in many jurisdictions. Even after
Palazzolo, that same knowledge weakens her claim, and often weakens it
substantially. A party’s knowledge that certain uses were unlikely to be
approved affects the way in which a court will later assess that party’s
reasonable investment-backed expectations. And some of the landowners
whose claims survive longer than they would have in the past probably lose
in the end anyway, after an even longer and more expensive dispute is
ultimately resolved against them.
To the extent that notice-rule cases mostly turn out just as they would
have beforehand, this result was entirely predictable from a careful reading
of the Court’s six opinions in Palazzolo. State and lower federal courts have
not been ignoring the case but rather have been applying it precisely as it is
written. Part III demonstrates that only a small subset of regulatory takings
claims should turn out any differently after Palazzolo, and the cases that
owners are losing since that decision are cases they could have predicted
would fail. Court watchers who believed in 2001 that Palazzolo would
change the takings landscape may have needed to review the Court’s six
opinions more closely. Plaintiffs are continuing to lose notice-rule cases at

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2003072

2012]

The Modest Impact of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island

729

nearly the same rate as before. This is not because judges ignore the law,
but because they apply it properly.257
CONCLUSION
It seems unlikely that landowners bringing notice-rule claims will
suddenly start to prevail in larger numbers. After many dozens of cases, the
sample of reported decisions to date is probably fairly random and
representative of cases that will arise in the future. If anything, one would
think that the plaintiffs who pursued their cases to the point that a court
published an opinion were those with the strongest arguments. The
regularity with which these disproportionately robust claims fail may
discourage future plaintiffs. The fact that even this skewed sample of cases
has led to so few judicial victories by owners reinforces the view that
regulatory takings claims, which were unlikely to succeed before Palazzolo,
remain unlikely to succeed today, even with a more relaxed version of the
notice rule in place. To the extent that owners, their lawyers, and others are
unhappy with that truth, the solution lies not in Palazzolo but elsewhere in
the substantive law of regulatory takings.
Nonetheless, advocates for property owners have become anxious for
the Court to revisit Palazzolo, as some of their petitions for certiorari
indicate. This Article responds to the argument that lower courts have failed
to follow the requirements of that case. Courts facing notice-rule claims are
aware of Palazzolo, they cite it appropriately most of the time, and they
nearly always reach results that are entirely in accord with it. This still
leaves open the question of whether the Court ought to re-examine the
notice-rule issue. Any knowledgeable observer of regulatory takings law
can supply his own list of preferred tweaks or overhauls, and I do not seek
here to set forth my own views as to whether it would be desirable to revisit
Palazzolo.
But to the extent that revisiting Palazzolo is a question of judicial
economy, I suggest that no changes are necessary. The initial result in that
case, with its six partially contradictory opinions, is not an easy read, and
lawyers and judges new to the field surely struggle with the case. But with
257. Not all observers agree with this conclusion, of course. See, e.g., J. David Breemer & R.S.
Radford, The (Less?) Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectations After Palazzolo, and the
Lower Courts’ Disturbing Insistence on Wallowing in the Pre-Palazzolo Muck, 34 SW. U. L. REV. 351,
417 (2005) (“[M]any state and lower federal courts seem content to proceed as if Palazzolo and TahoeSierra were never decided.”).
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some effort, it is possible to parse these six opinions and ascertain the rule
of Palazzolo. In fact, hundreds of judges have succeeded in doing exactly
this and have developed a body of case law in the lower courts that is
remarkably cogent. From a purely functional point of view, the Supreme
Court seems to have offered an understanding of the notice rule that is as
workable as any other and that operates smoothly. Despite the occasional
puzzling case, the lower courts by and large have interpreted Palazzolo
coherently and consistently, and there is no evident need for any type of
reaffirmation. So far, the Supreme Court appears to agree.
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